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Abstract 
This thesis inquires why Rwanda applied retributive justice in the aftermath of the 1994 
genocide. Considering the devastation the country found itself in, as well as the prominence of 
restorative approaches in Africa, it seems astonishing that Rwanda enacted extensive 
prosecution as main policy to deal with the genocide. In order to account for that phenomenon, 
various factors are examined with regards to their influence on the choice of transitional justice 
approach in Rwanda. The theoretical foundation of the research is derived from the transitional 
justice framework and existent work on the possible correlation between factors present before, 
during and after a transition and type of transitional justice approach pursued. The paradigms of 
retributive and restorative justice are introduced as values of the dependent variable, which is 
type of transitional justice applied. After a thorough discussion of the theoretical framework, the 
thesis proceeds to an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan case study. Here, the particular values 
that the independent variables nature of the previous regime, transition type, external actors and 
foreign policy considerations, and values and beliefs held by decision-makers take on are 
explored. The choice of a retributive approach is finally explained as a result of the combination 
of the discussed variables. 
 
In der vorliegenden Masterarbeit wird untersucht, weshalb Ruanda nach Ende des Völkermords 
im Jahre 1994 einen retributiven Weg der Vergangenheitsbewältigung einschlug. Dies ist 
insbesondere erstaunlich aufgrund der Schwierigkeiten, die sich dem zerstörten Land hierbei 
entgegen stellten, und vor dem Hintergrund, dass auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent bevorzugt 
restaurative Ansätze Anwendung finden. Zur Lösung der Problemstellung wird der Einfluss 
verschiedener Faktoren auf die Wahl eines bestimmten Transitional Justice Ansatzes, basierend 
auf Hypothesen aus der Literatur zu Demokratisierungsprozessen der 1980er und 1990er, 
untersucht. Die abhängige Variable basiert auf den Konzepten retributiver und restaurativer 
Justiz. Es erfolgt zunächst eine Darstellung der theoretischen Grundlagen, gefolgt von einer 
Analyse der Fallstudie Ruanda. Hierbei werden die unabhängigen Variablen im Falle Ruanda’s 
untersucht. Diese sind die Natur des vorherigen Regimes, die Art des Regimewechsels, externe 
Akteure und außenpolitische Abwägungen, sowie Werte und Überzeugungen der 
Entscheidungsträger. Ruanda’s Wahl eines retributiven Ansatzes ergibt sich aus der 
Kombination der diskutierten Faktoren. 
 
 
 
   1 
Introduction 
In the thirteen weeks after April 6, 1994, at least half a million people perished in the Rwandan 
genocide, perhaps as many as three quarters of the Tutsi population. At the same time, 
thousands of Hutu were slain because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces 
directing it.1 
The Rwandan genocide left the country shattered and the whole world in shock. It 
seems impossible to understand how thousands of people could have been slaughtered 
in open daylight, with the world watching but not interfering. Half a century after the 
Holocaust, the deadly power of an ideology of ethnic superiority and hatred had been 
once more demonstrated. One of the most shocking parts of the genocide, and at the 
same time one of the most challenging factors for the country’s future, was the high 
complicity of the population in the killings, stretching through all levels of society.2 The 
genocide was ended by the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
which subsequently formed a transitional government.3 Like many countries before, 
post-conflict Rwanda then faced the question of how to deal with its past. This question 
relates to transitional justice, a field which receives increasing attention from scientific 
researchers and practitioners. Its growing importance is manifested in the adoption of a 
report on transitional justice by the United Nations (UN) in 2004. Here, transitional 
justice is defined as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses.”4 
Within the international community, even though there exists a broad agreement on 
the necessity to react to norm violations such as war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide, more divergence shows in the discussion of how such a reaction should look 
like.5 The practice of prosecuting perpetrators for crimes committed under a former 
regime which gained increasing prominence departing from the precedent set by the 
Nuremberg Trials was challenged by the Eastern European and Latin American 
transitions in the 1980s and 1990s, in which countries increasingly employed strategies 
such as lustration, truth commissions or the granting of amnesties to deal with their 
violent past. Subsequently, truth commissions and war crime tribunals emerged as the 
                                                
1 Des Forges 1999, Introduction. 
2 Cf. Jones 2010, 28. 
3 Cf. Brown 2011, 179. 
4 UN Security Council 2004, 5. 
5 Cf. Roberts 2003, 120. 
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most prominent instruments within the field of transitional justice.6 One way to 
conceptualize the variety of transitional justice approaches at hand is by employing the 
theoretical framework of restorative and retributive justice. Whereas restorative justice 
can be said to be focusing on dialogue involving all stakeholders, with a goal of 
repairing the harm that was done, retributive justice is characterized by an emphasis on 
punishment by the state, which is justified in light of the rules that were broken.7 The 
main mechanism employed by Rwanda after the genocide was criminal prosecution.8 
The country thus chose a highly retributive approach, and this despite the huge 
logistical challenges it faced in doing so. “Retribution can be understood as vengeance 
curbed by the intervention of someone other than the victim and by principles of 
proportionality and individual rights.”9 Considering that it is a “duty-based approach, 
strongly influenced by Kantian and Hegelian philosophy,”10 it seems curious at first 
glance that Rwanda would favor such a rather ‘Western’ concept over others. Especially 
since it is often claimed that African cultures share a common perception of community 
assuming primacy over individualistic values.11 For instance, Desmond Tutu, famous 
for his role in the South African transition, which can be placed in roughly the same 
time period as Rwanda’s, refers to restorative justice as corresponding to African 
values: 
Retributive justice is largely Western. The African understanding is far more restorative- not so 
much to punish as to redress or restore a balance that has been knocked askew. The justice we 
hope for is restorative of the dignity of people.12 
The question arises why Rwanda chose the mentioned particular way to deal with its 
past. Why was the country favoring retribution over other approaches? What were the 
factors that led Rwanda to adopt a more retributive transitional justice approach, as 
compared to a more restorative one? 
Research Question 
This thesis inquires why Rwanda applied retributive justice after the genocide. 
Corresponding to a proposal made by Elster (1998), which perfectly describes the issues 
that are dealt with in this thesis, the research is conducted on “political decisions made 
                                                
6 Cf. Teitel 2003, 70; Roht-Arriaza 2006, 2-5. 
7 Cf. Jones 2010, 34-35. 
8 Cf. Drumbl 2000, 291. 
9 Minow 1998, 12. 
10 Mani 2002, 33. 
11 Cf. Mani 2002, 48; Villa-Vicencio 2009b, 65. 
12 Tutu in Minow 1998, 82. 
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in the immediate aftermath of the transition and directed towards individuals on the 
basis of what they did or what was done to them under the earlier regime.”13 Here, the 
concern is with factors that influenced those decisions in terms of political capacity and 
political will. Classifying transitional justice as either retributive or restorative puts the 
focal point of the analysis on retroactive justice. 
In order to answer the research question, the historical background of the conflict 
and the genocide, going back until the time of colonization, has to be taken into 
account. However, the main analysis is restricted to the context of the transition. 
Transitional justice in any society is an ongoing process, however, for analytical 
purposes, a time period has to be demarcated here. Research is conducted on the time 
period immediately following the genocide, when initial decisions about transitional 
justice were made. This is framed as starting in 1994 because the end date of the 
genocide in July 1994 simultaneously marks the beginning of transitional justice 
becoming an issue in the country. The adoption of genocide legislation and the 
beginning of genocide trials in Rwandan national courts in 199614 are considered as 
marking the end of the period in which initial responses to the violence were 
established. 
In order to solve the research problem, questions that have to be addressed involve 
first of all the transitional justice options that were available to Rwanda, with a focus on 
those that were actually discussed, and including the ones brought forward by external 
actors. Further, the factors that had an influence on the final decision, and also the goals 
and priorities Rwanda set in this process are issues to be analyzed. It is to be expected 
that Rwanda’s choice of a retributive transitional justice approach was highly influenced 
by decision-makers’ political power and also political will. 
Methodology and Research Design 
The thesis conducts a qualitative in-depth analysis of a case study. The research is 
deductive, applying the transitional justice framework and its work on the possible 
correlation between factors present before, during and after transition and type of 
transitional justice approach pursued to make sense of the Rwandan case study. Further, 
the theoretical framework of retributive and restorative justice is used to classify the 
Rwandan transitional justice approach. The research is of analytical nature, since the 
                                                
13 Elster 1998, 14. 
14 Cf. Schabas 2008, 214-215. 
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objective is to draw conclusions from analyzing the link between the examined factors 
and the transitional justice approach taken. 
The dependent variable concerns the type of response given to human rights abuses 
under a previous regime. It is thus the transitional justice approach employed in order to 
deal with suspected perpetrators of past atrocities. There exists a large variety of 
instruments in the field of transitional justice, accordingly also a number of dependent 
variables.15 However, to consider all possible options would make the analysis too 
complex. Therefore, the dependent variable this thesis focuses on is the type of justice 
applied. The value it can take on is either retributive or restorative justice. The same 
goes for the independent variables. Due to space limitations, the analysis has to focus on 
a limited number of influencing factors, the majority of which are derived from 
literature on transitions. The independent variables are then nature of the previous 
regime,16 transition type,17 external actors and foreign policy considerations,18 and 
values and beliefs.19 Nature of the previous regime can be further refined into the level 
of complicity, presence or absence of the options of exit and voice, the history of 
repression and the level of legitimacy of the previous regime. Likewise, transition type 
concerns the distribution of power, the emerging political landscape and different 
modes of conflict resolution. The hypotheses derived out of these variables’ possible 
correlation with the dependent variable are tested. The research design is mainly derived 
from literature written about post-communist transitions. In order to test the hypotheses 
in the Rwandan case they are adapted to the context of a transition from violent internal 
conflict. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is treated as an 
independent rather than a dependent variable, since this thesis focuses on transitional 
justice as decided upon and implemented by the Rwandan state. Even though it is taken 
into consideration that Rwanda initially asked for the ICTR to be established, the 
analysis treats it mainly in terms of the influence its mere existence had on transitional 
justice options available in Rwanda.  
Moreover, the Gacaca Courts are not included in the analysis. This is justified in 
light of the fact that Gacaca was launched in its pilot phase in 2002 as a reaction to 
                                                
15 For an assortment see for example Elster 1998, 17-27. 
16 Cf. Huntington 1995, Moran 1994, Welsh 1996, Nedelsky 2004. 
17 Cf. Huntington 1995, Welsh 1994. 
18 Cf. Kaufman 2005. 
19 Cf. Elster 1998. 
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shortcomings of the initial transitional justice approach, as stated on its official 
homepage in the following: 
The slowness of procedures and the important delay in the trial of these cases represented a 
serious risk of hindering the efforts made for the reconciliation of the Rwandans. It became 
clear that it was necessary to modify the strategy and to look for another solution to the 
problem. His Excellency, the President of the Republic, called a reflexion and consulation 
meeting that has resulted under the inspiration of the traditionnal context of conflicts resolution 
in the establishment of the Gacaca Courts.20 
The objective of the analysis at hand is to account for the initial reaction of the 
Rwandan transitional government, and how factors present at that time influenced its 
decision. Alterations made later on as a form of lessons learned are not part of the 
research since taking them into account risks distorting the findings. This is because it 
cannot be clearly established to what part the adoption of the new approach of Gacaca 
was in fact influenced by the independent variables and not only a result of lessons 
learned from the transitional justice approach taken on until that point. Thus, there 
would be a risk that Rwandan transitional justice in the form of national prosecution as 
initially introduced after the genocide - the dependent variable - would to a certain 
extent also become an independent variable, as exerting influence on the adoption of 
Gacaca. 
Many discussions about transitional justice take on a normative approach.21 
Discussions about the topic tend to be heated, especially since many advocates of a 
particular position operate in the political arena, entangled in what Daly (2001) refers to 
as the “politics of selling justice ideals.”22  The possibility of bias stemming from 
political motives behind the arguments has to be taken into account. A qualified and 
informed look at the literature is very important to not get entangled in those normative 
arguments. However, the analysis tries to take into account that decision-makers 
themselves hold normative assumptions and partly act upon those. Since it is not 
possible to look into people’s heads, this thesis takes into consideration general 
perceptions held about benefits, or respectively drawbacks of transitional justice 
policies. This then does not involve any attempt to judge them normatively. 
A last point to be mentioned in advance is that even though the thesis often refers to 
Rwandan transitional justice, because decisions made within that framework affected 
the whole Rwandan society, in fact it lay in the hands of the transitional government to 
                                                
20 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdicitons 2011. 
21 Cf. Elster 1998, 7-8. 
22 Daly 2001, 32. 
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make those decisions and implement them. Therefore, it has to be born in mind that 
even if there is reference made to Rwanda choosing a particular mechanism, before the 
background of a highly divided society and a recently ended civil war, this is not meant 
to imply that the whole society was involved in the decision-making in a democratic 
manner. 
Research Objectives 
At the center of the analysis stands the question why a particular transitional justice 
approach was chosen in Rwanda. The aim of this thesis is hence not to assess the 
efficiency of Rwandan transitional justice, as there exists already sufficient literature on 
that topic. It is rather to find out what the raison d’être behind the choice was, along the 
line of what outcome the transitional justice instruments were expected to bring, and 
how the final choice was influenced by various factors. 
This thesis also aims to add to the still thin conceptual framework of transitional 
justice. Most literature accounting for the variation in transitional justice outcomes is 
written on transitions in the ‘third wave of democratization’.23 Transitional justice is a 
theme that is attributed growing importance in today’s globalizing, conflict-ridden 
world. This thesis tries to account for the Rwandan transitional justice approach by 
applying the existing literature to the case study. At the same time, this can contribute to 
the general work on transitional justice by de-contextualizing hypotheses derived from 
third wave transitions and seeing if the claims made by the literature can be verified in 
the Rwandan case. 
Further, Rwanda serves as an academic valuable example, since the country had to 
come to terms with a past that involved internal conflict, civil war, and genocide, and in 
the present world situations in which transitional justice plays a role are increasingly of 
an inter-society conflict nature. 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into a theoretical and an empirical part. For the theoretical 
framework that the research is based on, first of all the field of transitional justice is 
explained. After defining the paradigm, an overview over its historical development is 
given. Further, the main dilemmas and constraints that decision-makers in the field face 
                                                
23 The term was coined by Huntington in his book “The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth 
century”, in which he analyzes countries’ transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy 1974 – 
1990, cf. Nedelsky 2004, 66. 
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are discussed. The next point provides the first part of the basis upon which the 
methodological framework for the analysis is constructed. Various works by theorists 
who have written on the possible influence of certain variables on the type of 
transitional justice approach chosen are discussed. Those are Huntington (1995),   
Welsh (1994, 1996), Nedelsky (2004), Moran (1994), Kaufman (2005), and            
Elster (1998). The independent variables that subsequently arise are nature of the 
previous regime, transition type, external actors and foreign policy considerations, and 
values and beliefs. The second part of the theoretical framework is provided by the 
concepts of retributive and restorative justice. First, the main principles underlying each 
are discussed. The next point connects the two justice paradigms to the transitional 
justice framework. For this objective, the concept of justice is explored in more detail, 
employing Mani’s (2002) categorization of three dimensions of justice. Finally, the 
dependent variable and the specific values it can take on, namely retributive and 
restorative justice, are elaborated. 
The empirical part starts with the background and history of the conflict in order to 
establish the context in which to place the transition. The section also enumerates 
factors from the past that had implications for the conduct of transitional justice in 
Rwanda. The next chapter first describes the different policy options that were 
discussed after the genocide and subsequently continues with the classification of the 
approach that was finally adopted according to the theoretical concepts introduced 
beforehand. Accordingly, it is established in how far the approach of post-genocide 
Rwanda, namely the decision to prosecute all perpetrators, was rather retributive. The 
next part finally analyzes the factors that contributed to the choice of this particular 
transitional justice approach in Rwanda. The first variable to be analyzed concerns the 
nature of the former regime. Next, the type of transition is explored. As a third variable, 
influential external actors and their role in the decision-making process are considered. 
Also, foreign policy considerations of Rwanda are taken into account. The fourth 
variable relates to decision-makers’ values and beliefs. Here, constraints on the possible 
array of transitional justice options as well as the conclusions that were drawn out of 
those and the beliefs that decisions were based on are analyzed. The thesis concludes by 
recapturing the findings inferred from the analysis in an evaluation, and summing them 
up in an informed statement about Rwanda’s choice of transitional justice approach. 
   8 
State of the Art and Research Material 
This thesis consults literature from the subject areas of justice, transitional justice, 
regime transitions, and sources relating directly to Rwanda. For the former, literature on 
justice is used to explore the concept of justice per se and the paradigms of retributive 
and restorative justice. Concerning the state of the art, a huge part of scholarly work is 
done on the integration of restorative justice in the traditionally rather retributive 
oriented legal systems of Western states. Whereas some scholars focus on defining 
restorative justice, while arguing for its superiority, others increasingly promote a 
reconciliation of the restorative and the retributive paradigm.24 Most literature on 
transitions stems from the analysis of democratizing countries of the 1970s through the 
1990s. However, increasingly research is done on transitions from violent conflict. 
Regarding the subject area of transitional justice, a growing epistemic community in the 
field is contributing to theoretical conceptions as well as its practical application. Since 
many of the organizations that are part of this epistemic community work on the 
ground, they expand the transitional justice literature in a manner that is informed by 
their practical experiences. A prominent and influential example is the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), founded in 2001. Since South Africa is one of the 
most prominent transitional justice examples, many important organizations can also be 
found on the African continent, for instance the African Transitional Justice Research 
Network or the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Stemming from its close 
connection to human rights issues, advocacy for transitional justice also comes from the 
side of organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) or Human Rights Watch 
(HRW). Again, theory and practice inform each other. For instance, HRW had a big 
influence on the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Therefore, a lot of the literature on transitional justice takes on the 
form of reports and articles, often referring to a specific country case study. This also 
connects to the issue that a lot of influential works in the field are written by 
practitioners who were involved in transitions.25 There are a few, more general books on 
the topic, mainly tracing its historical development.26 More specifically relating to 
Rwanda, the genocide and the issue of transitional justice regarding the country is a 
topic well discussed in literature. Most literature deals either with the genocide, and the 
                                                
24 See for example Braithwaite 2002, Daly 2001, Marshall 1999, von Hirsch, v. Roberts, and Bottoms 
2003, Zehr 1985. 
25 See for example Goldstone 1998, Villa-Vicencio 2009b, Zalaquett 1995. 
26 See for example Elster 2004, Kritz 1995, Sriram 2009, Teitel 2003. 
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failed reaction of the international community, or assesses the transitional justice 
process in terms of its results and efficiency.27 
In addition to the scientific literature providing the theoretical foundation for the 
analysis, literature about the background of the genocide is considered in order to 
explain the specific needs that transitional justice in Rwanda had to address. Secondary 
sources about transitional justice in Rwanda provide information on where to localize 
the Rwandan approach along the line between retributive and restorative justice. 
Further, secondary sources about the involvement of international actors, such as the 
UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals who took on a consulting 
role are used. Information about international treaties and conventions as well as 
practices that had been employed in other transitions help frame the international 
context in which the Rwandan transition has to be placed. 
The research material consists of sources from the decision-making process that 
took place after the end of the genocide. In addition, the analysis takes into account 
documents that were published before that as a reaction to ongoing violence. Thus, the 
information about the transitional justice options that were put forward by different 
agents is drawn from primary sources such as requests of NGOs reporting about human 
rights abuses in Rwanda or recommendations that conferences on the issue of 
transitional justice in Rwanda put forward, including the end report of a conference 
involving Rwandan and international voices held in Kigali in 1995. 
1 Theoretical Framework 
The paradigm of transitional justice as well as the categories of retributive and 
restorative justice provide the theoretical foundation the research is based on. Whereas 
the independent variables and hypotheses to be tested are derived from literature about 
transitions, the categories of retributive and restorative justice are considered as the 
values that the dependent variable can take on. 
1.1 Transitional Justice 
As the practice of transitional justice has been gaining prominence over the last decades, 
the body of literature on the phenomenon has been growing. However, it is not possible 
to speak of a theory of transitional justice as such. Rather, the field is characterized by a 
                                                
27 See for example Clark and Kaufman 2008, Dallaire 2003, Des Forges 1999, Fujii 2009, Mamdani 2001, 
Prunier 1995, Gourevitch 1998. 
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diversity of approaches and a practice-orientation.28 A huge part of the literature focuses 
on the various transitional justice instruments that exist, such as truth commissions,29 
reparations or war crime tribunals, and their efficiency in given situations. However, a 
lot has been written on the relationship between factors present at transition and 
particular transitional justice approach adopted, especially in the context of transitions 
in Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America. This scientific research provides the 
conceptual framework, out of which hypotheses to be tested in the case study of 
Rwanda are derived. 
1.1.1 Definition 
There are various definitions of transitional justice and opinions on the role it should 
take on diverge.30 Broadly, it can be understood as the “response to systematic or 
widespread violations of human rights.”31 Transitional justice does not necessarily 
constitute a special form of justice.32 Teitel (2003) defines it as a “conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront 
the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”33 Her definition however neglects 
non-judicial measures and furthermore restricts the practice of transitional justice to a 
defined period of transition.34 The UN (2004) adopts a broader definition, stating that 
transitional justice is “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”35 At the same time, the 
UN connects transitional justice closely to the rule of law.36 Still another definition 
shows the increased attention given to post-conflict societies when it describes 
transitional justice as involving “states and societies shifting from a situation of conflict 
to one of peace and, in the process, using judicial and/or non-judicial mechanisms to 
address past human rights violations.”37 While some definitions of transitional justice 
focus on the pursuit of justice from a legal perspective, others take on a more holistic 
                                                
28 Cf. Clark 2008, 193. 
29 A truth commission can be defined as “an official body, often created by a national government, to 
investigate, document, and report upon human rights abuses within a country over a specific period of 
time”; Teitel 2003, 78. 
30 Cf. UN Security Council 2004, 5. 
31 ICTJ 2008, 1. 
32 Cf. ICTJ 2008, 1. 
33 Teitel 2003, 69. 
34 Cf. Roht-Arriaza 2006, 1. 
35 UN Security Council 2004, 5. 
36 Cf. UN Security Council 2004, 1. 
37 Kaufman 2005, 58. 
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approach, adding moral, social, political and economic dimensions. With conflicts being 
increasingly of an inter-society nature, reconciliation assumes a central role in 
transitional justice processes. Similar to transitional justice, the concept of 
reconciliation is also a very debated one. The way it is understood in the research at 
hand, reconciliation can be defined as “the rebuilding of fractured individual and 
communal relationships after conflict, with a view to encouraging meaningful 
interaction and cooperation between former antagonists.”38 
Another term used to describe mechanisms that can be employed after a regime 
change is ‘retroactive justice’.39 Altogether, the term ‘transitional justice’ per se is a 
debated issue. Some argue that the subject field’s reference to ‘justice’ is misleading 
since the issues referred to connect to numerous areas. For instance, it is argued that 
they are increasingly related to security studies.40 Another point for controversy derives 
from the other half of the term. As can be seen, one main theme that definitions on 
transitional justice vary according to is their respective understanding of ‘transition’, 
and thus the spectrum of situations in which transitional justice is employed. The term 
‘transition’ was traditionally closely connected to the shift from one political system to 
another, and the main focus of transitional justice lay on transitions from authoritarian 
to democratic regimes. This rather narrow and normative view that developed out of 
experiences from transitions from authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s is 
increasingly challenged. Especially within the emerging epistemic community on 
transitional justice, definitions are broadened to include any mechanism employed to 
deal with the past in any situation. Thus, transitional justice is increasingly perceived to 
also take place in situations where the transition is not made to democracy, or there is 
no transition per se but still a need to come to terms with the past. In this regard, 
transitional justice also affects countries that are not newly emerging democracies, such 
as post-conflict societies, authoritarian countries captured in ongoing conflict, or mature 
democracies.41 
 Two of the main goals of transitional justice are to prevent recurrence and repair 
damage caused. Its diverse objectives revolve around establishing justice, truth, peace, 
democracy, reconciliation, forgiveness and healing.42 Transitional justice possesses both 
a backward and forward looking characteristic since it revolves around the issue of how 
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to address abuses committed under a past regime in a way that guides a society into a 
peaceful and stable future. The multitude of interests and needs present in such a 
situation make the enterprise of transitional justice a highly complex one. Tensions 
result out of the sometimes conflicting objectives. Complexity is added since 
transitional justice takes places in various dimensions, namely the individual, local, 
national, and international one, and because an increasing number of actors have a stake 
in its enterprise. Thus, next to the government of the state concerned, the international 
community and increasingly non-state actors like NGOs or business organizations try to 
have a say in policies enacted after a transition.43  
 Given different countries’ unique history, culture and circumstances, each one has 
to find its own way of dealing with its past. However, there is a certain repertory of 
transitional justice options emerging, war crime tribunals and truth commissions being 
among the most prominent mechanisms used. Moreover, lessons can be learnt because 
many of the challenges, which countries in transition face are similar.44 In addition, one 
country’s handling of its transition to a certain extent influences the options available to 
others by shaping international norms and expectations. For this reason, it is important 
to consider the historical background of the transitional justice movement. 
1.1.2 History 
According to Teitel (2003), transitional justice can be said to have undergone broadly 
three phases in its development. Those she divides roughly into the period after the 
second World War, the transitions of the third wave of democratization, and the end of 
the 20th century. 
 Issues of transitional justice affected countries before 1945. However, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were the point at which transitional justice became both 
international and extraordinary.45 The importance of the trials derives from the fact that 
for the first time leaders were held accountable for crimes committed against their 
national subjects by the ‘international community’, represented by the Allied powers. 
Instead of relying on national trials, international criminal law was applied beyond the 
state to individuals on the basis of bringing them to account for crimes against 
humanity.46 Judgments on the fairness of the trials diverge and ever since they took 
place they faced the accusation of victor’s justice. The argument is that they were 
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misused to justify the Allied powers’ intervention, were one-sided because no-one from 
the side of the Allies was put on trial for war crimes and were unfair because judges 
were affiliated with the winning side.47 Nevertheless, to provide trials at all was not a 
given at that time. Thus, leaving aside issues of fairness in the actual conduct of the 
trials, the decision to establish them in the first place, and therefore to rely on legal 
processes, is what had an important influence on any transitional justice conduct that 
followed. Further, in establishing international accountability for war time abuses 
committed by state officials the trials limited state sovereignty. In addition, the 
Nuremberg Trials acknowledged the murder of the Jews by the Nazis as genocide, a 
term which Lemkin defined in 1944 as acts with the intent to destroy a group. In this 
regard, the trials created a precedent out of which international human rights norms like 
the Genocide Convention eventually evolved.48 Despite these important developments 
concerning international jurisdiction, it took as long as 1992 until with the ICTY 
another international tribunal was established.49 
 After a period in which the attention of most of the world revolved around the 
power struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union, concerns about transitional 
justice were revived with the end of the Cold War. The so called third wave transitions 
from authoritarian rule to democracy challenged the liberal belief in the universalizing 
quality of certain norms, like for example the idea of the rule of law as an 
unquestionable tool of state modernization. Countries emerging from authoritarian rule 
insisted on the primacy of sovereignty so that the focus lay on nation building and the 
legitimacy of national jurisdiction. However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials still 
remained important insofar as they served as a frame of reference for the rule of law 
built up in the newly democratized states and for the trials that were taking place on a 
national level.50 At the same time, post-transition governments in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America emphasized the preservation of peace, which was believed to be 
achievable not only via criminal prosecution. Debates about the usefulness of different 
transitional justice mechanisms gained prominence, featuring the discussion about 
either applying prosecution or granting amnesty especially in Latin America. 
Transitional justice started to be seen as a tool that could be used to redefine national 
identity, and many nations adopted an amnesty policy in order to reconcile society.51 
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The complexity of transitional justice began to show as the new regimes dealt with 
human rights abuses committed under predecessor regimes in various ways. No longer 
was it external actors enforcing their vision of dealing with the past and punishment on 
the country in transition, as it had been the case after World War II, but those decisions 
were to a certain degree made within the society. The dilemmas resulting out of this 
required compromises to be made. A growing emphasis was put on establishing the 
truth about what happened under the authoritarian regime and goals of transitional 
justice now included issues such as reconciliation, forgiveness, and the healing of 
society. This also meant that the arsenal of transitional justice instruments grew, since 
approaches differing from the classical retributive one emerged.52 Truth commissions 
nowadays assume such a prominent role also because with them the discourse on 
transitional justice, which after the Nuremberg Trials more or less fell into oblivion, was 
revived.53 With the emphasis that many countries in third wave transition put on 
restorative approaches, the two objectives truth and justice started to be portrayed as a 
dichotomy.54 
 Finally, in today’s globalizing world, the increasing number of conflicts makes the 
field and practice of transitional justice move from exception to norm.55 This is 
exemplified by the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).56 
The ICC is also characteristic for a refocus on achieving justice through prosecution, a 
trend which mainly emerged because of efforts of the epistemic community in this 
field.57 Transitional justice is now characterized by an interdependence of the national 
and international level and a great number and diversity of policy options that are 
available to countries.58 New challenges arise as conflicts increasingly take place 
between societal groups and thus huge parts of the population are involved in criminal 
abuses, so that one of the main goals transitional justice has to achieve is reconciliation 
within a society. Whereas many governments established after Cold War transitions saw 
the key to success in distinguishing themselves clearly from the predecessor regime, in 
a country emerging out of an intra-society conflict, a concentration on highlighting the 
divisions might just reinforce a cycle of violence. At the same time, transitional justice 
leads to an increased politicization of the law. Conflicting objectives are inherent to 
                                                
52 Cf. Teitel 2003, 77. 
53 Cf. Bachmann 2011, 22. 
54 Cf. Teitel 2003, 78-79. 
55 Ibid., 71. 
56 Ibid., 90 
57 Cf. Bachmann 2011, 23; Roberts 2003, 121. 
58 Cf. Kaufman 2005, 58; Roht-Arriaza 2006, 9-1; Teitel 2003, 78. 
   15 
transitional justice, and political decisions in such situations often lead to rule of law 
standards being compromised to a certain degree.59 
1.1.3 Dilemmas 
Dilemmas of transitional justice concern those inherent in decisions made about the 
objectives of a certain policy, and those that arise from the post-conflict situation per se. 
Even though somewhat artificial dichotomies, the two main conceptual dilemmas that 
can be found in the transitional justice literature can be summarized as ‘truth versus 
justice’ and ‘peace versus justice’.60 Those debates originated as a challenge to the 
perception of justice as the main objective of post-transition societies and prosecution as 
the main instrument to reach that goal. Thereby, the concept of justice is altered as new 
dimensions are added. A closer look on this is provided in chapter 1.2.3. 
 The peace versus justice dilemma is derived from the potential threat that an 
insistence on accountability can pose to peace building in fragile post-conflict societies. 
Whereas the peace versus justice debate concerns the immediate goals a policy 
prioritizes, truth versus justice can refer to two different beliefs of how to achieve the 
same goal, for instance reconciliation.61 It deals with the question of whether truth or 
justice should be prioritized in order to achieve long-term peace and stability. However, 
both dilemmas are oversimplified. Peace and justice are interrelated and with regards to 
truth and justice, the pursuit of one does not necessarily have to exclude the other.62 For 
instance, trials also aim at establishing the truth in form of a historical record, and truth 
commissions might be regarded as important supplementary instruments to trials.63 On 
the other side, for a truth commission to function properly, an incentive has to be 
provided for the suspected perpetrators to tell their stories, and the possibility of 
subsequent criminal prosecution might be an impediment to that. 
Different kinds of dilemmas arise from the specific constraints that especially post-
conflict societies face, and which challenge the pursuit of transitional justice. Problems 
like a traumatized population, destroyed infrastructure, lack of resources or a high level 
of complicity in the population broaden the gap between aspiration and capability.64 In 
case the country decides to enact criminal prosecution the question of whom to put on 
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trial arises. Especially when a huge part of the population committed crimes under the 
former regime, a decision has to be made how far down the chain of command 
prosecution should proceed. Again, keeping the balance between addressing what 
happened in the past while at the same time guiding the country into a stable future 
plays a role. Practical issues have to be considered, since major difficulties can arise 
from putting a huge percentage of the population on trial, not only because of the time 
and resources this enterprise consumes, but also because people with experience and 
knowledge that served under the previous regime are needed to build up new 
institutions. Further, to establish a rule of law, it is regarded crucial to provide certain 
standards like a fair trial to everyone, including persons put on trial for gross human 
rights abuses. This might however lead to frustration and anger in the population, 
especially in countries where resources are limited and victims might be forced to live 
in poverty.65 In Rwanda, a lack of understanding for the upholding of such standards, 
especially for the prohibition of death penalty, at the ICTR was one of the factors that 
led the government to vote against the Tribunal’s establishment and added to the 
negative perception of the court within the population.66 Another practical issue 
concerns the importance of local ownership, which possibly comes at the expense of 
impartiality. Especially in post-conflict regions, the charge of a perceived ethnic bias 
can risk the credibility of newly built institutions and might thus fuel new conflicts.67 
Another important dilemma underlying transitional justice is that of finding a proper 
balance between a ‘whitewash’ and a ‘witch-hunt’. Transitional justice has a highly 
political dimension to it, which means that steps undertaken have to aim at achieving 
justice not only for the victims but also for the country as a whole, and for its future. 
Thus, the post-transition government faces the task to distinguish itself from the 
predecessor regime while at the same time avoiding the reinforcement of old divisions 
within the society.68 It could be argued that the spectrum of options available reaches 
from two extremes, one being full and unconditional amnesty, the other being strict 
prosecution of perpetrators,69 or even execution without trials. Each country has to 
decide where along that path to go, and this decision is influenced by a variety of 
factors, most of which are discussed in the next chapter. However, the following general 
considerations about the usefulness of prosecution as a transitional justice tool also 
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matter because they provide the basis according to which decision-makers can estimate 
policy outcomes. 
 Although not the same, the peace versus justice debate relates to the prosecute or 
pardon question insofar as justice is predominantly perceived in terms of legal justice, 
which is then regarded as achievable through prosecution, whereas amnesty is justified 
on grounds of long-term stability and peace.70 There are various arguments brought 
forward for as well as against prosecution as a transitional justice mechanism. One of 
the main dilemmas regarding this issue is the question if prosecution helps a society to 
move forward after a conflict in that it serves to distinguish the new government from 
the old regime, thus giving it credibility and legitimacy, or if criminal proceedings 
rather highlight divisions within society and prolong past conflicts. The latter argument 
was the dominant one in many transitions in Latin America, where blanket amnesty was 
seen as the best way to achieve reconciliation and to rebuild the nation.71 Proponents of 
prosecution regard it first of all as a tool to reinforce moral standards and to re-establish 
a just moral order. Another main argument in favor of criminal court proceedings is that 
they are seen as necessary to fight impunity by officially condemning crimes that were 
not punished under the previous regime. Thereby, it is argued, the new political system 
is strengthened.72 In addition to its deterrent quality, proponents of prosecution see it as 
a way to bring about justice by putting those responsible for atrocities on trial. Another 
quality of court proceedings is that they establish individual accountability, which is 
especially of great importance in countries where conflict was fueled by tensions among 
groups.73 Further, it is argued that prosecution serves as an official acknowledgment of 
the victims’ suffering in establishing a truthful account of what happened and giving 
them an opportunity to voice their experiences as witnesses.74 However, opponents 
argue that the formalized protocol of the court room restricts the effects wished for and 
can even further traumatize witnesses and harden divisions.75 They state that the court 
room setting restrains real communication between victim and perpetrator because the 
focus lies on confrontation.76 It is further criticized that trials only establish objective 
and factual truth, which most of the times does not clarify the causes and consequences 
of the violence. In comparison, it is suggested that other, more victim-oriented 
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approaches give every person involved the opportunity to have his or her subjective 
experience and version of the story heard and thus offer an opportunity for polarization 
between groups to be overcome.77 In addition, trials run the risk of being perceived as 
victor’s justice, especially if prosecution is one-sided, thus crimes committed by officers 
of the new regime are not sanctioned.78 Further, if trials fail in providing certain 
standards to the accused, as is often the case in post-conflict situations, which are 
characterized by a lack of resources and other constraints, they run danger of being 
perceived as measures of revenge. This can reinforce tensions and violence, especially if 
penalties include execution.79 Another tension concerns the rule of law. Whereas some 
argue that prosecution and the punishment of abuses committed by the old regime is 
necessary to build up a rule of law and democratic state, the principles of nulla poena 
sine lege and ex post facto make it difficult to punish acts that were not constituting a 
crime under national law when they were committed.80 One possible way to circumvent 
that problem stems from the emerging body of international law and norms, including 
for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which aspires universality, and 
would thus make certain crimes punishable no matter the national legislation under 
which they were committed.81 
 Whatever the normative arguments, depending on the context, as explained above, 
post-transition governments face many constraints, which restrict the choice of 
transitional justice options available to them. Thus, a government may for example be 
willing but not able to strictly prosecute human rights abuses. Especially the literature 
analyzing post-communist transitions suggests some variables that constitute a possible 
influence upon those decisions. 
1.1.4 Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
The research problem this thesis tries to account for is why a particular transitional 
justice approach is chosen. The dependent variable is explored in more detail in section 
1.2; there are however some points that need to be clarified in advance. At the center of 
the analysis stands what Huntington (1995) calls the torturer problem, which concerns 
the following questions: 
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How should the democratic government respond to charges of gross violations of human rights 
[...] committed by the officials of the authoritarian regimes? Was the appropriate course to 
prosecute and punish or to forgive and forget?82  
 
Huntington thus distinguishes two clear-cut options: either prosecution, followed by 
punishment, or forgiveness, which for him includes forgetting the past. There are some 
points that have to be reflected upon concerning this torturer problem. First of all, many 
scholars and practitioners would argue that to forgive does not mean to forget. On the 
contrary, it might even be important to remember in order to honor the victims and be 
able to move on.83 Secondly, as has been discussed before, prosecution is not the only 
transitional justice mechanism at display. If Huntington’s approach is adapted to the 
existing variety of transitional justice instruments, the torturer problem can be reframed 
as follows. In a first step, a country has to decide if it wants to address the past or not. 
Concerning the latter option, some would argue that to do nothing about the past can 
also be a strategy.84 If the country decides to address its past, the next question is how to 
deal with the suspected perpetrators, namely whether it wants to and can punish them.85 
Options reach from passing an unconditional amnesty, forgiving without forgetting - for 
example in the form of a truth commission that abstains from any form of follow up 
prosecution, over lustration to criminal prosecution.86 Four independent variables and 
the hypotheses resulting out of them are considered in order to account for variation in 
the outcome of the torturer problem. Those are the nature of the previous regime, the 
type of transition, the role of external actors and foreign policy considerations, and the 
impact of decision-makers’ values and beliefs. 
 Huntington’s model is derived from the transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy of the 1980s and 1990s. Those revolutions in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa are also referred to as the third wave of 
democratization. Huntington distinguishes between three different modes of transition. 
Mode here refers to the process of regime replacement and varies according to the 
distribution of power between former and incoming regime during and after transition. 
In the first mode, which he calls transformation, the transition is initiated from a part of 
the old regime, whereas in replacements the opposition gains strength and enforces the 
regime change. Finally, in transplacements the balance of power is roughly equal, so 
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that both forces have to come to a negotiated compromise.87 Huntington then uses this 
mode of exit of the authoritarian regime to explain variance in the outcome of the 
torturer problem across countries. He thus defines justice as a function of political 
power. Since in replacements, officials of the former regime are no longer in a position 
of power, those are most likely to result in prosecution and punishment. As additional 
variables he names the time aspect and the level of complicity of the population. 
Accordingly, he states that justice has to come quickly because the population regards 
punishment more legitimate when the wounds from the past are still fresh and because 
the more time passes, the higher the probability that agents from the previous regime 
regain some form of political power.88 Huntington was one of the first scholars to 
research the variability in transition outcomes and approaches to deal with the past 
across countries. His hypothesis has been tested, criticized and modified by various 
other scholars. 
 Welsh slightly modifies Huntington’s approach. She de-emphasizes the 
significance of type of transition and assigns a more important role to different modes 
of conflict resolution between the parties involved in a transition to democracy. For her, 
the concept of bargaining is crucial, independent of transition mode.89 Moreover, she 
emphasizes the influence that the past has on the present and future. In this regard, the 
history of political repression plays an important role. Like Huntington, she also stresses 
the factor of time. Thus, it matters if memories of state terror are fresh or already fading 
at the time of transition. For example, she describes how the latter was the case in many 
Central and East European countries because there the mode of repression was changing 
over time, with physical violence having been the strongest at the time of communist 
takeover and being gradually replaced by more structural violence. In addition, Welsh 
puts the politics of the present at the center of attention, stating that efforts directed 
against officials of the former regime are less likely to be taken if those regain a 
position of power. Therefore, she takes into account the political landscape emerging 
after transition.90 
 Nedelsky adopts a similar approach. Trying to account for divergence in the Czech 
and Slovakian responses to their common past, she offers the level of the former 
regime’s legitimacy as an explaining variable.91 Drawing on a typology originally put 
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forward by Kitschelt, Nedelsky focuses her analysis on two factors. First of all, she 
explores how the former regime sought societal compliance, namely either through 
repression or through cooptation. Secondly, she dissects the population’s relationship to 
the regime into cooptation, internal exile and opposition.92 Nedelsky uses this typology 
to account for the former regime’s legitimacy while bearing possible repression of 
opposition in mind. She argues that support within the society for a certain transitional 
justice approach varies according to the perception the population has of the previous 
regime, thus relating to the question if people found it unjust. Both Welsh and Nedelsky 
identify the need to place the transitions under scrutiny into a more historical 
framework.93 Whereas Welsh assigns an important role to the history of political 
repression of opposition forces, Nedelsky goes further. For her, the nature of the former 
regime influences the population’s experience with it and thus perception of it. In this 
regard, transitional justice becomes not an elite decision but is highly dependent on 
societal support.94 
 Another scholar elaborating on Huntington’s thesis is Moran. He tries to account 
for an apparent lack of a causal relationship between democratization process and 
outcome of the torturer problem in Eastern Europe. Huntington’s hypothesis, Moran 
argues, is not confirmed since Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, classified as 
transformation and transplacement countries, show more of a tendency to prosecute and 
punish than the German Democratic Republic (GDR), where a replacement took place. 
Moran suggests that an explanation has to be found in the differences between East 
European countries and proposes the variables of exit and voice as objects of analysis. 
He emphasizes the psychological characteristic of those variables, as opposed to the 
structural nature of the paradigm suggested by Huntington. He derives those variables 
from studying three countries, each responding to one of Huntington’s transition types. 
Analyzing how the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia went about solving the torturer 
problem, Moran finds that instead of transition type, the outcome was determined by 
how opposition forces could become active against the regime. Here, the two variables 
of exit and voice indicate whether opposition forces were given the opportunity to leave 
the country or had some freedom to utter their discontent while staying in the country.95 
Moran suggests that if one or both of those options existed under the former regime, it is 
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more likely that the outcome of the torturer problem is to forgive and forget.96 His 
argument is that if the opposition is severely repressed under the former regime, and the 
option to leave the country is also denied, anger adds up and it is more likely for 
prosecution to be asked for after transition. This demonstrates the psychological 
dimension that Moran sees involved. In his opinion, people who stood by and did 
nothing to stop the crimes, “frustrated neutrals”97 as he calls them, would insist on 
prosecution of officials of the previous regime in order to clear their own conscience. 
Thus, it seems that the option of prosecution and punishment here primarily serves the 
society to reaffirm shared values and principles that were abused in the past, the 
punishment of those guilty of criminal abuses thus becomes solely a means to an end. 
Moran compares the situation with a pressure cooker, which explodes and results in 
vengeance if none of the relief options, neither exit nor voice, are existent. He explicitly 
stresses the psychological and emotional dimension involved in decisions about 
transitional justice.98 
 Another variable to be considered is provided by Kaufman. He raises the question 
of the role that foreign policy considerations play in the conduct of transitional justice.99 
Analyzing the influence the USA had on transitional justice in Iraq and the role that the 
ICC might play in the future, Kaufman emphasizes how some transitional justice goals 
and processes are related to domestic, regional and global order and stability.100 This 
raises two issues. First of all, attention is brought to why and how external actors get 
involved in another country’s transitional justice conduct and thus exercise their 
influence on it.101 This adds another dimension to Huntington’s paradigm of justice as a 
function of political power, since in a globalizing world increasingly international actors 
influence the distribution of power in post-conflict societies. Secondly, it can be 
inferred that the way in which the country in transition itself employs transitional justice 
is influenced by foreign policy considerations. Since one priority after violent conflict is 
to lead the society into a stable future, an enterprise which in today’s interdependent 
world cannot be reached in isolation, international norms and regional issues shape a 
country’s transitional justice approach just as much as domestic considerations.102 
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 Finally, a last variable can be conceived from Elster’s work. Among others, he 
considers the specific constraints arising from the context of a transition, as well as the 
role that actors’ values and beliefs play in the adoption of a particular policy. Here, the 
conclusions that decision-makers draw out of the situation in which they act become 
just as important as the constraints themselves in their impact on the choice of 
transitional justice instrument. Since actors’ choices are highly influenced by beliefs 
they hold about the likelihood of a certain outcome of a policy, the points enumerated in 
the section about dilemmas of transitional justice can also provide some explanation for 
why a certain policy was chosen.103 Elster further also refers to level of complicity as an 
important variable for explaining a country’s response to past atrocities. According to 
him, there exists a causal relationship that can be illustrated as a curve. A high level of 
complicity of the population with the old regime correlates with a low interest in 
retribution. On the other end of the spectrum two options emerge. Elster distinguishes 
between those cases where a low level of complicity correlates with the wish for 
retribution and those where the independent variable takes on the same value, the desire 
for retribution however remains low. The latter, he argues, are people who focus on 
reconciliation and reconstruction, and see those objectives more likely to be fulfilled 
leaving the past behind. In this regard, the impact of people’s values and beliefs is 
demonstrated. Up until a medium level of complicity, the demand for retribution then 
increases. He further stresses the role of alliances, which are likely to be formed among 
those who want to forget the past, either to move forward or because they are guilty 
themselves.104 
 Four sets of independent variables can be inferred from the scholarly work explored 
above. Accordingly, the nature of the previous regime can be established as a first 
variable. It results out of Moran’s work on exit and voice, Huntington’s and Elster’s 
level of complicity, Welsh’s history of repression and Nedelsky’s level of legitimacy. 
The second variable is the transition type, based on the mode of transition according to 
the distribution of power as suggested by Huntington and the emerging political 
landscape and different modes of conflict resolution as suggested by Welsh. A third 
variable is derived from Kaufman and concerns the role that external actors as well as 
foreign policy considerations play. Finally, the work by Elster provides a fourth 
variable, namely the values and beliefs held by actors that decide about transitional 
justice. The hypotheses arising out of this framework, which are spelled out in more 
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detail when applied to the Rwandan case study, have to be seen as linked in the sense of 
a multi-causal model. This means that none of them can explain the dependent variable 
in isolation. Here it is important to distinguish between necessary and sufficient 
conditions that have to be fulfilled for the dependent variable to take on the value of 
retributive justice. For example, while a certain transition type on its own might be a 
necessary condition for retributive justice to be applied, it might not suffice in 
explaining why no other option was chosen. It is the combination of all of the 
independent variables taking on a certain value that in the end explains the particular 
transitional justice approach adopted by Rwanda. 
 The scholarly works upon which the conceptual framework is based originated 
within the specific circumstances of so called third wave transitions. Whereas the latter 
refer to a process of democratization, the Rwandan transition was from a situation of 
violent conflict to one of peace.105 Moreover, Huntington frames the torturer problem as 
directly referring to how to deal with the officials of a former regime, whereas in a post-
violent conflict situation like the one in Rwanda, decisions about transitional justice 
concern how to deal with a number of perpetrators from all societal levels, possibly 
constituting a major part of the population.106 Further, the crimes in Rwanda were acts 
of genocide.107 Thus, violence was not only an instrument to spread terror in order to 
repress dissident. The primary intent was to exterminate the whole population group of 
the Tutsi. Another major difference between third wave transitions and the case of 
Rwanda is that in the latter there was no gradual replacement of an authoritarian regime 
involving bargaining and power struggle between the military and political elites. The 
specific context of the Rwandan situation, which will be explained in more detail below, 
is that the conflict was ended by the military victory of one side. Indeed, an opening up 
of the political space, and a subsequent emergence of a variety of political parties and 
actors, as well as an exiled opposition movement characterized the context that Rwanda 
has to be placed into in the early 1990s.108 It would however be misleading to analyze 
this as a particular form of distribution of power and mode of transition in the sense 
used by Huntington. The distribution of power preceding the Rwandan genocide rather 
relates to the factors leading to the massacres, insofar as the government propagated 
ethnical hate to cling on to political power in the country, than it is part of the 
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transitional context, in which the victorious RPF replaced the ruling party and ended the 
genocide. Despite those differences, inference drawn from the scholarly works on third 
wave transitions can still provide important insights on the question of the choice of 
particular transitional justice mechanism. The dilemmas and constraints faced by the 
country and transitional justice options available are comparable but exacerbated by the 
fact that Rwanda was emerging from a violent conflict.109 
1.2 Retributive and Restorative Justice 
The concept of justice includes many aspects and dimensions. In a broad sense, it can be 
defined as “a response to a powerful moral intuition that [...] something must be done to 
right the wrong.”110 Even if there exists agreement that some response to a wrong is 
necessary, what constitutes this ‘something’ that must be done is a highly debated issue. 
The diversity of possible reactions to a crime is reflected in the multitude of theories of 
justice. Those differ in their conceptualization of justice and crime, and therefore also in 
the processes they apply, and the objectives they try to reach.111 Out of the various 
theories on justice, the two paradigms of retributive and restorative justice are chosen to 
complement the conceptual foundation of this research. They provide the theoretical 
background upon which the dependent variable is based. Since the research revolves 
around the question of transitional justice approach chosen, the main focus lies on the 
different processes, or instruments, that the two paradigms put forward in order to 
achieve justice. This is however closely connected to two other issues. First of all, it is 
important to understand how crime is defined in the respective theories. Secondly, it 
needs to be considered how the paradigms differ in their understanding of justice and 
thus in the results they expect justice to bring about. 
 To begin with, there are some points that retributive and restorative theories of 
justice agree on. They both argue that wrongdoing needs to be censured and the 
offender needs to be held responsible one way or another in order to achieve justice.112 
Furthermore, they both are committed “to establishing/ re-establishing social equality 
between the wrongdoer and the sufferer of the wrong.”113 They however differ in their 
understanding of how to do that. Further, there are some scholars who argue that the 
two theories that are often portrayed as a dichotomy actually overlap, for example in 
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that restoration would require retribution, and that therefore they should be reconciled. 
Daly (2001) even goes further by critically arguing that illustrating the two in a 
dichotomous relationship is not an innocent perspective but that such “dichotomies are 
also used to construct normative positions about justice”114 and that “the contrast is a 
highly misleading simplification, which is used to sell the superiority of restorative 
justice and its set of justice products.”115 Bearing in mind those problematic motives 
and the normative character that works written on the concepts might have,116 the two 
approaches are nevertheless first of all explained according to how they differ. This is 
justified since the primary aim here is not to explore the two paradigms in depth and see 
how they could overlap, but to use those two categories as a basis on which to describe 
the values of the dependent variable. Further, the analysis is not normative, and thus 
does not ascribe superiority to neither concept. 
1.2.1 Retributive Justice 
The retributive theory of justice is the dominating one in Western society. The paradigm 
is characterized by a top-down approach putting the state at the center and by a focus on 
guilt and punishment. 
 The retributive justice concept is based on the underlying perception that a crime 
constitutes a violation of a law and is therefore an offense against the state. The focus 
lies on the rule that was broken.117 Hence, justice is defined as a system of “right 
rules.”118 It is seen as the state’s responsibility to punish the offender.119 The retributive 
approach to justice is strongly influenced by the work of Kant and Hegel. 
Corresponding to Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’, the justification for punishment is 
found in the moral obligation to react to a wrongdoing. Society then has the right as 
well as the duty to punish the wrongdoer.120 The retributive justice approach puts the 
state, represented at court by its proxies, at the center of the justice process, so that 
adversarial relations are established between state, victim, and offender.121 Accordingly, 
the state represents the community. Therefore, the process that is employed to bring 
                                                
114 Daly 2001, 21. 
115 Ibid., 8-9. 
116 Cf. Daly 2001, 12. 
117 Cf. Jones 2010, 35; Zehr 1985, 4, 12. 
118 Zehr 1985, 13. 
119 Cf. Zehr 1985, 4. 
120 Cf. Mani 2002, 33-34; Minow 1998, 12. 
121 Cf. Daly 2001, 8. 
   27 
about justice is structured in a hierarchical and top-down manner.122 The legal definition 
of crime as an offense against the state excludes victims.123 In the retributive paradigm’s 
understanding, accountability means that the offender owes a debt to society, and this 
debt is paid by offenders being punished for the crime they committed. Retributive 
justice as applied in the courtroom has a confrontational setting. The offender focuses 
on telling his story in a way that s/he thinks will result in the lowest sentence because of 
the a priori character of the process. The latter refers to the provision, known even 
before the process starts, that in case of guilt there is going to be some form of 
punishment enacted.124 Interaction between victim and offender is kept at a minimum 
level.125 
 Retributive justice is based on the ‘just desert’ principle.126 The term ‘desert’ is 
derived from the word ‘to deserve’. The principle indicates that the punishment must fit 
the crime. In addition to the adherence to proportionality, this implies at the same time 
that punishment has to be in reaction to the crime that was committed, and cannot be 
primarily based on other justifications, such as for example deterrence.127 Determining 
the right form of punishment is regarded as one of the main tasks in the retributive 
process.128 Retributive justice can then be perceived as backward looking since it 
focuses on establishing guilt and punishing, the justification of which is found within 
the committed crime, which inevitably took place in the past.129  
At the same time, retributive justice is closely linked to rule of law principles. As 
mentioned, it is the dominant paradigm in Western societies, and thereby closely 
connected to democratic ideals, such as government by laws.130 As such, pursuing 
prosecution is regarded as an important ingredient in the process of establishing a 
democratic order. The other way around, a functioning rule of law system is needed in 
order to pursue prosecution and conduct trials.131 
 In summary, the ontology underlying the retributive justice approach is to 
comprehend justice in purely legal terms. A crime is seen solely in consideration of the 
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law that was violated.132 As will be explained in the next point, restorative justice 
suggests additional dimensions. 
1.2.2 Restorative Justice 
Although restorative practices and thoughts can be traced back to times of ancient Arab, 
Greek, and Roman civilizations,133 as an influential theory of justice it is a relatively 
new paradigm. It gained prominence in the 1970s,134 as a critical reaction to other 
theories of justice, especially the retributive one.135 There seems to be a common 
perception of retributive justice as the rule and restorative justice as the exception, as an 
alternative approach that challenges prevailing assumptions. Thus, a lot of the literature 
deals with justifying on normative grounds why restorative justice should be applied 
and how this can be achieved. Having originated as a form of counter-movement to a 
theory that was no longer regarded adequate, there exists a lot of controversy on the 
restorative paradigm.136 This concerns especially its relation to punishment. Moreover, a 
huge part of the literature on restorative justice concerns the latter’s integration into the 
legal justice system of states. Innovative measures aim at reconciling restorative justice 
with more traditional approaches, for instance by incorporating restorative principles 
into the criminal system in the form of restorative prisons.137 As mentioned before, 
those debates are not of concern here. Instead, the overview depicts some kind of lowest 
common denominator of restorative justice theorists. Further, restorative measures here 
have to serve as the other end of the spectrum departing from prosecution, although 
there is a tendency amongst scholars to reconcile the two: “Increasingly, scholars are 
coming to see the value of theorising justice in hybrid terms [...].”138 
 In general, restorative justice can be defined as “a process whereby parties with a 
stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the 
offence and its implications for the future.”139 Here, it is suggested that a restorative 
theory of justice puts the harm that was caused by the breaking of a rule at the center. 
Crime is not so much regarded as a violation of a rule but more a violation of one 
person by another, and is perceived along the lines of the relationships that it leaves 
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fractured.140 Out of this particular conceptualization of crime evolves an emphasis that 
restorative justice puts on restoring relationships by involving all stakeholders, namely 
the perpetrator, the victim and the community. In this regard, it criticizes the central and 
representative role the state takes on in the retributive paradigm, stating that retributive 
justice takes the process away from those who own it. Regarded as stakeholders are not 
only the ones directly involved in the crime, namely perpetrators and victims, but also 
the community. This includes not only those directly affected by the crime but also the 
society at large because it is their norms that were violated.141 With the main objective 
being restoration, the process becomes just as important as the outcome – along the 
lines of the saying ‘the journey is the reward’. Within the process, there is a special 
emphasis put on dialogue and negotiation.142 It is suggested that communication 
between perpetrator and victim not only serves to restore their relationship but also 
helps the perpetrator to accept his or her guilt and take responsibility for it. As opposed 
to the a priori character of the retributive paradigm, a restorative process leaves the 
penalty option open for discussion between the participants. The focus does not lie on 
the kind of action that the offender has to take on as a response to the crime he or she 
committed. The question of adequate censure becomes secondary because restorative 
justice is victim-centered.143 Emphasis is put on letting the victim tell his/her story in a 
setting that is favorable to that endeavor. In contrast to the just desert principle, here a 
specific kind of sanction is chosen with regards to how it can best serve restoration.144 
In this context, one central question is how to reintegrate the offender into the 
community. The community as understood here is connected by the concept of 
citizenship, and the offender has to be restored as fellow-citizen. Justice then becomes 
the (re)building of relationships, with a focus on healing. Thus, even though restorative 
justice also considers the past in which the crime was committed, its focus on the 
fulfillment of obligations created by the wrongdoing gives it more of a future-oriented 
character.145 A typical example for a restorative procedure is victim-offender 
mediation.146 
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 In summary, the restorative paradigm is based on an ontology that views justice not 
only in legal but also in moral, social, economical and political terms.147 Considerations 
from all of those fields influence the conduct of justice, and the focal point is put on a 
future-oriented restoration of relationships. 
1.2.3 Connection to the Transitional Justice Framework 
Incorporated into the research design, retributive and restorative justice serve as 
characteristics of distinct transitional justice approaches, and as a spectrum along which 
the latter can be categorized. Even though the basic principles the two respective justice 
paradigms are based on remain the same, some conceptual peculiarities arise depending 
on whether they function as a response to an individual crime or within the context of 
broader political conflict.148 Further, the responses they provide, and constraints and 
complications they face in doing so, vary according to the nature and gravity of the 
crime.149 The issue becomes more complicated in a situation of violation of human 
rights: “The call for justice arouses charged political and personal sentiments that are 
aggravated by the nature of the excesses committed during conflict.”150 In Rwanda, the 
nature of the excesses took on the form of genocide.  
 In order to establish the connection between the retributive and restorative 
paradigms of justice on the one and the transitional justice framework on the other side, 
it is necessary to understand the concept of justice in a post-conflict context. As 
mentioned before, justice is a very wide concept, and there exists no common 
agreement on neither its nature nor its scope.151 One possible conceptualization of 
justice is suggested by Mani. Referring to Aristotle’s work, she distinguishes three 
dimensions of justice that post-conflict societies are challenged to address. Those are 
legal, distributive and rectificatory justice. Legal justice refers to the rule of law, 
whereas distributive justice concerns the structural injustices that often underlie 
conflict.152 “Rectificatory justice refers here to the question of dealing with injustices in 
terms of direct physical violence suffered by people during conflict,”153 and as such 
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connects directly to the transitional justice issue of addressing human rights abuses. 
These different dimensions of justice are not to be conceptually confused with different 
approaches to justice. Retributive and restorative justice fall into the latter category. 
Being paradigms of justice, they revolve around the ‘how’ question, namely how to 
bring about justice, which ends to reach and means to employ. The dimensions of 
justice suggested by Mani in contrast rather deal with the ‘what (to address)’ question, 
namely with the demands of justice and the different kinds of injustices that need to be 
addressed. Depending on whether a more retributive or more restorative justice process 
is pursued, different priorities are set and some of the justice demands are rather met 
than others. 
 Although the categories put forward by Mani are used, the view proposed here does 
not fully correspond to the one of the author.154 Mani states that all three dimensions of 
justice are interdependent.155 Nevertheless, it seems that she places transitional justice 
directly and solely in the framework of rectificatory justice.156 Transitional justice as 
understood in the research at hand however is the overarching concept whose 
mechanisms can address up to all three dimensions of justice. This is based on the 
understanding that rectificatory justice refers to human rights abuses, distributive justice 
to structural injustices and inequalities, and legal justice to the rule of law, and 
transitional justice can encompass all three of them. Furthermore, Mani treats retributive 
justice, utilitarian punishment, and informal justice, which for her incorporates 
restorative justice, as sub-categories of the rectificatory justice dimension.157 In contrast, 
here it is suggested that retributive and restorative justice are modes, which influence 
the overall conduct of all dimensions of justice as well as the priorities set among them. 
Thus, a retributive justice process might prioritize legal justice and result in addressing 
rectificatory injustices in a way that relies on legal mechanisms to a great extent. 
Opposed to that, a restorative approach might compromise on the issue of tackling legal 
injustices and instead put a stronger focus on addressing distributive injustices in order 
to avoid recurring conflict in the future. Hence, depending on the justice paradigm 
pursued, different instruments are chosen and different objectives are promoted. It is in 
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this respect that categories of retributive and restorative justice directly connect to the 
dependent variable. 
1.2.4 Values of the Dependent Variable  
As already mentioned in chapter 1.1.4, the dependent variable can be described in terms 
of a slightly modified version of Huntington’s torturer problem. The dependent variable 
then is the particular transitional justice approach adopted. The values it can take on in 
the research design at hand are either restorative or retributive justice. It has however to 
be born in mind that those categories are a simplification of the phenomenon, since first 
of all no measures are either purely restorative or retributive and secondly the spectrum 
of transitional justice instruments encompasses in real practice far more than two 
options. Nevertheless, having only two values for the dependent variable is justified 
since the research question deals with the general factors that lead a country to adopt a 
rather retributive or rather restorative mechanism, without exploring in detail how that 
mechanism then looks like exactly.  
 Thus, the research problem whether to prosecute or pardon is depicted as the choice 
between a retributive and a restorative strategy. The literature usually lists truth 
commissions as an example for a restorative transitional justice instrument.158 The 
concern shown for future-oriented issues in the restorative paradigm corresponds to the 
emphasis that some transitions put on peace and reconciliation, sometimes in exchange 
for strict application of legal justice. Many authoritarian regimes left the citizens 
traumatized and deprived of any trust into state institutions. It could be argued that this 
was one reason for the emphasis that post-authoritarian regimes put on restoring the 
social fabric as compared to a stronger focus on accountability. Criminal prosecution 
stands at the other end of the spectrum of transitional justice options. As “the most 
radical interpretation of acknowledgment and accountability,”159 it reflects a retributive 
approach. 
It could be argued that, even though the two paradigms share some goals and even 
processes, they differ in how they set priorities. One example for that is the issue of 
acknowledging the victim’s suffering. In a retributive justice court room setting, this is 
one effect argued to be achieved, however it is not the primary aim of the court 
proceeding. The primary aim is to find out about the facts, to establish guilt and find the 
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right punishment for the violation of the law.160 In contrast, in the restorative paradigm, 
ritual is seen as an essential part in the acknowledgment of the victim’s suffering and 
the restoration of fractured relationships. Emphasis is put on the process.161 The ritual 
takes on primacy, so that efforts focus on placing the process in a setting that is as 
supportive to the ritual as possible. 
In a post-conflict situation, justice is both a function of political power and a 
function of political calculation. The former refers to the ability of the governing body 
to implement a certain kind of justice, the latter to the will to do that.162 The following 
section analyzes the characteristic of both in the case of Rwanda. 
2 Case Study Rwanda 
Every Rwandan is either a genocide survivor or a perpetrator, or the friend or relative of a 
survivor or perpetrator.163 
But is it practicable to judge some 87,000 people for genocide and related crimes, in a judicial 
system whose personnel have been decimated and whose material infrastructure devastated?164 
[...] no judicial system has ever sought to prosecute crimes committed by 125,000 persons 
against over 800,000 victims.165 
It seems stunning that the decision-makers in Rwanda pursued such an ambitious 
policy, especially when the specific challenges that this post-genocidal society faced are 
taken into consideration. As mentioned before, the conduct of transitional justice is 
highly context dependent and involves the setting of priorities between various goals. 
By taking into account “what a given transition is from and what it is to,”166 a 
connection is made between the past sought to address and the present in which policies 
are enacted. Thus, it is first of all important to consider the historical background, in 
which the conflict has to be placed and out of which certain implications follow. 
Further, the range of policy options that were suggested, discussed in section 2.2, 
demonstrates that the transitional justice approach adopted by Rwanda was by no means 
the only viable one, so that the question of why retributive justice was applied is 
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reinforced. In order to solve this puzzle, different factors have to be examined with 
regards to how they rendered retribution the approach to be chosen. 
2.1 History & Implications  
About 800,000 people were murdered during the Rwandan genocide, the majority of 
which belonged to the group of the Tutsi.167 Various factors and actors played a role in 
the historical forefront of the horrible events, although it is important to keep in mind 
that the genocide cannot be regarded the ‘logical’ outcome of any factors that added up 
to it.168 Nevertheless, a crucial role was played by ethnicity and its misuse as a tool to 
propagate mass hatred. 
 Historically, Rwanda’s population consisted of two major population groups, the 
majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi, as well as the minor group of the Twa, all of 
which migrated to the future territory of Rwanda over the centuries. No agreement 
exists on their relationship before colonization and on the issue if respective Rwandans 
felt a Hutu or Tutsi group identity at all, especially since the groups mingled due to 
intermarriage and shared a common history, language, and culture.169 Hutu and Tutsi 
initially had a social, as opposed to an ethnic, meaning within the hierarchical 
organization of the society. Originally, the Tutsi were herdsmen, and the Hutu 
cultivators. Within the process of increasing centralization and annexation of formerly 
autonomous areas pursued by a monarchy ruled by a Tutsi king, the Tutsi became 
known as the ruling elite group, whereas the masses were called the Hutu.170 However, 
instead of being fixed categories based on ethnic origin, those more constituted political 
identities that fluctuated over time. For instance, it was possible for a Hutu to be 
ennobled and become a Tutsi.171 The concept of ethnicity was introduced during 
colonization. Rwanda was first colonized in 1898 by the Germans, and then passed on 
to Belgian rule after World War I.172 Both colonizing states employed a ‘divide and 
rule’ strategy. In the course of an increasing centralization of power, the colonizers 
exercised direct control over the Tutsi only, to whom then control over the rest of the 
population as well as over formerly autonomous areas was granted.173 This entailed a 
discrimination of the Hutu, for example in terms of access to education and good jobs, 
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and intensified the perception of the Tutsi as a ruling elite and the Hutu as an oppressed 
class.174 These developments were accompanied by a manipulation of history. Tutsi 
scholars told a biased version of history that reinforced the belief in the Tutsi’s 
superiority and distinctiveness that the colonial powers themselves disseminated based 
on European ideas about race.175 The Tutsi-centric historical record was subsequently 
diffused by the written word.176 At the same time, the Tutsi being depicted as foreigners 
that had conquered Rwanda centuries ago laid the groundwork on which propaganda 
against the former would later be based on.177 In 1933, the Belgian colonial power 
institutionalized the concept of ethnicity in Rwanda by the adoption of identity cards, 
which indicated the belonging of a person to one of the three respective ‘ethnicities’. At 
this time, eighty-five percent of the population was identified as Hutu, fourteen percent 
as Tutsi, and one percent as Twa. This step made the constructed ethnic groups even 
more permanent in character and embedded in everyday life.178 
In 1959, in the course of decolonization, the Tutsi elite was overthrown in what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Hutu Revolution’. Subsequently, in 1961, the first republic 
of Rwanda was established, led by the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) 
party under President Kayibanda.179 Categories of the Tutsi’s distinctiveness, before 
employed by some Tutsi themselves to institutionalize their power under Belgian rule, 
were now used by leading Hutu to establish solidarity among the, constructed as a 
supposedly united and homogeneous but actually highly diverse, Hutu group.180 During 
that time, the ideology of ‘Hutu power’ emerged, which depicted the Hutu as the nation 
and the Tutsi as an alien race.181 It was this ideology that the propaganda of the 
genocide as a form of self-defense was later based on.182 In the course and aftermath of 
the revolution, about 20,000 Tutsi were killed and an additional 300,000 fled the 
country into exile.183 The events had serious implications for the future of the country. 
First of all, the violence of those years never being punished added to a culture of 
impunity and helped to establish a pattern and method of violence. In fact, in 1963 and 
1974 two amnesty laws were passed. Those exempted Hutu citizens from being held 
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accountable for political violence and thus constituted a legal basis for the 
marginalization of the minority Tutsi group and ongoing violence against Tutsi 
citizens.184 Secondly, the events furthered the solidification of the concept of two 
irreconcilable groups by providing them with diverging memories on the events, 
depicted as tragic in the emerging Tutsi and as heroic in the emerging Hutu memory.185 
In addition, parts of the exiled Tutsi community, which later on established the RPF, led 
incursions into Rwanda beginning in the 1960s. Spreading fear about the exiled Tutsi 
aiming at restoring the monarchy, there were reprisal attacks against Tutsi citizens in the 
country and the government started to build up the state structure that was later misused 
to orchestrate the genocide, incorporating so called civil defense units.186 
In 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana overthrew the political regime in a military coup and 
subsequently founded the second republic of Rwanda, governed by himself as president. 
Political power shifted away from the central and southern to the northwestern region. 
This move is representative for Rwandan politics, where the struggle for power was 
predominantly between regions. In 1975, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National 
pour le Developpement (MRND) was founded as single party of the Rwandan state.187 
Habyarimana’s regime stayed in power until he was killed when his plane was shot 
down on 6 April 1994. This event marked the beginning of the genocide.188 
Various factors played an important role in the advance of the genocide. First of all, 
in the late 1980s, Rwanda’s economy collapsed so that the country was dependent on 
help from the donor community. In the course of structural adjustment, the Rwandan 
government stood under international pressure to conduct political reform and liberalize 
the country. At the same time, a small number of elites formed an opposition 
movement, demanding a multi-party system.189 Moreover, in October 1990 the RPF 
invaded Rwanda and a guerilla style civil war began.190 During the conflict, many Hutu 
civilians were killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the estimated numbers 
reaching from 25,000 up to as many as 45,000 deaths for the time period April to 
August 1994 alone. RPA soldiers also committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, which is a politically charged topic in post-genocide Rwanda.191 In 1993, the 
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Arusha Accords peace agreement was signed. Among other things, it included a power-
sharing plan for the political system in Rwanda.192 All those events put pressure on 
Habyarimana and forced him to introduce a multi-party system in 1991.193 However, in 
order to prevent a loss of power, extremist forces used the civil war as an excuse to stop 
the reform process and to militarize the society under the guise of civilian self-defense. 
Propagating mass hatred and fear of the Tutsi, the constructed ethnic conflict served the 
government as a distraction mechanism diverting attention away from political and 
legitimacy problems and was used as a way to consolidate and preserve power. Actually 
however, regional identities and political opinions constituted the real cleavage.194 Thus, 
the violence was not a spontaneous eruption of ancient ethnic hatred but planned and 
structured by the Rwandan authorities.195 One distinct feature in the Rwandan genocide 
was the central role that the media, more precisely a radio station, Radio Télévision 
Libre des Mille Collines, and a newspaper, Kangura, assumed in inciting the 
population. Spreading fear of a re-established Tutsi hegemony, extremist propaganda 
portrayed the Hutu as the eternal victims and the killings as a matter of self-defence.196  
Violence against Tutsi had prevailed in Rwanda since it had gained independence 
and massacres of Tutsi and political assassinations already took place in the beginning 
of the 1990s.197 The genocide started on 6 April 1994 and was ended 18 July 1994 with 
the RPF’s military victory. More than half a million Tutsi and 5000 Hutu, the latter 
mainly members of the political opposition, as well as sympathetic Twa were killed 
during the genocide.198 After the military victory, the RPF pursued massive arrests of 
suspected perpetrators in order to stop the ongoing violence.199 Violence however did 
not end together with the war because exiled parts of the defeated Rwandan army kept 
on attacking Rwanda from neighbouring countries, while individuals within Rwanda 
launched reprisal attacks against Hutu citizens.200 
There are various distinct features of the Rwandan genocide that posed specific 
challenges in the post-conflict situation and had serious implications for the conduct of 
transitional justice in the country. First of all, since people literally killed their 
neighbors with whom they had long-standing ties, those acts constituted not only a 
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physical but also a social violation of an extreme kind. In addition, it was large groups, 
not individuals, going on killing sprees. The killing was public and at close range, with 
mainly machetes and sticks being used as killing instruments, adding to the extreme 
cruelty of the Rwandan genocide.201 There was further an enormously high number and 
concentration of killing and extensive use of rape. The genocide left about forty percent 
of the population either dead or exiled. In addition, the killings being organized in a 
grass-roots manner resulted in a high level of conspiracy due to massive involvement of 
the population at all levels of society.202 Thus, the country’s institutions were not only 
shattered because of the violence, but also deprived of people with expertise, since most 
were either dead, in exile, or suspects of crimes related to the genocide. Accordingly, 
after the genocide only about twenty-five per cent of judicial personnel was left.203 
Further, most infrastructure had been destroyed during the conflict. Especially critical 
was the state of the prisons and the lack of even basic equipment in official state 
buildings. Moreover, due to Rwanda’s long-standing history of a culture of impunity, 
the challenge was less to rebuild institutions than more to build them anew. Especially 
the rule of law had never really existed due to an inefficient and corrupt justice system 
that served the government as a political instrument.204 Another point that influenced 
the perception of necessary actions in post-genocide Rwanda was the international 
community’s failure to intervene to stop the genocide. Even though UN peacekeeping 
forces arrived in Rwanda in October 1993, the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) was ineffective because it was overburdened and under-resourced, 
lacking the necessary UN Chapter VII mandate.205 Fearing another failed peacekeeping 
operation like the one in Somalia and misinterpreting the situation in Rwanda as being 
caused by ancient tribal hatred, the UN Security Council denied UNAMIR the support it 
needed to be able to intervene.206 Further, the necessity to stop ongoing violence and 
establish order put the Rwandan government under serious time constraints.207 Finally, 
decisions about post-genocide policies were made within a highly emotional context.208 
However, the main challenge resulting from the unique situation that characterized 
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Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide was the absolute necessity for reconciliation, 
since there was no possibility for two distinct states to emerge in its territory:209 
Never before in modern memory had a people who slaughtered another people, or in whose 
name the slaughter was carried out, been expected to live with the remainder of the people that 
was slaughtered, completely intermingled, in the same tiny communities, as one cohesive 
national society.210 
Those are the factors that characterized the situation that Rwanda found itself in after 
the genocide and out of which a range of objectives for transitional justice in the 
country can be derived, some of which in tension with each other. First of all, one 
urgent goal was to combat the culture of impunity that had prevailed in the country 
since decolonization. Within that, the country faced the twin challenges of addressing 
the crime of genocide while at the same time building a legitimate and functioning legal 
system from scratch.211 Further, in order to render revisionism impossible, the 
establishment of an accurate and independent historical account of the genocide and its 
antecedents was important,212 including the need of a reconciliation of history, more 
precisely of the debate about the nature of Tutsi-Hutu relations before colonization.213 
Out of this, one tension concerning the politics of memory can be derived. Whereas one 
argument was that the topic of ethnicity had to be included and confronted, the post-
genocide government declared referral to ethnicity a crime of divisionism.214 Since 
Rwanda had witnessed the deadly consequences of people being defined by their 
belonging to an ethnic group, a major concern was establishing individual responsibility 
for the crimes, so that no collective guilt would be ascribed to the Hutu. Another issue 
that especially external observers pressed for was bringing every perpetrator to account 
instead of pursuing victors’ justice, thus also prosecuting RPA soldiers who had 
committed crimes.215 Furthermore, in Rwanda’s post-conflict situation balancing the 
objectives of bringing about justice and consolidating a democracy was a very difficult 
undertaking because of the high stakes that different population groups had in each 
option. Whereas most members of the minority group of the Tutsi wanted the 
perpetrators to be brought to account, most of the majority Hutu had an interest in 
democratic decision-making, not only out of fear of revenge directed against them but 
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also because they did not want a return to past arrangements, which had been 
characterized by a power monopoly held by the Tutsi.216 Finally, the danger of survivors 
pursuing revenge had to be addressed. Therefore, detaining suspects and establishing 
accountability was regarded crucial.217 
2.2 Transitional Justice Options & Classification of Mechanism Employed 
Having ended the genocide by military force, the victorious RPF established the 
transitional ‘Government of National Unity’218, which was consequently the main actor 
in the decision-making process following the regime change. Because of the shocking 
scale of the violence and the devastation that it had left Rwanda in, various actors got 
involved to help the country address its past. This variety of agents resulted in a range 
of transitional justice options being put forward, some of which more restorative and 
some more retributive in nature. Two documents, analyzed in the following, 
demonstrate which options were considered. 
First of all, in November 1994, the transitional government organized a conference 
on the question of possible responses to the genocide, to which various national and 
international actors were invited. Corresponding to the challenges arising from the 
country’s specific situation mentioned above, the conference established a range of 
objectives. Those included bringing the enormous number of perpetrators to justice, 
addressing the needs of the survivors, dealing with the refugees, establishing security 
and stability, pursuing reconciliation and preventing such violence from happening ever 
again.219 The transitional government ruled out amnesty from the beginning.220 Overall 
priority was given to unity and reconciliation.221 As a means to achieve those goals, 
justice was regarded as absolutely necessary: “Justice is indispensable for healing and 
stabilizing the society and for uprooting the impunity.”222 Further, peace was seen as 
being linked to reconciliation, which again was regarded as only achievable through the 
acknowledgment of guilt.223 In addition, establishing the truth in a way that renders 
revisionism impossible was also regarded essential in the process of bringing about 
national reconciliation. Even though the government stressed the importance of 
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establishing accountability from the outset, a more restorative approach similar to the 
one pursued in South Africa was also considered.224 The Kigali Conference report 
mentioned the creation of “para-legal mechanisms such as a Truth Commission”225 as 
one alternative to the classical legal system. Especially representatives from South 
Africa strongly promoted such a commission as the ‘African’ approach to transitional 
justice.226 Considering the economic situation Rwanda found itself in, decisions about 
transitional justice naturally included decisions about the distribution of limited 
resources. Therefore, some actors argued that money spent on conducting trials should 
better be used on reparations.227  
The other document that serves as an example for the options debated after the 
genocide resulted from a conference held by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
in September 1994. Participants included scholars, officials from the US and the UN, 
and the prime minister of Rwanda. The report stressed the need for justice and 
accountability to be established, and thus argued for a retributive approach in the form 
of criminal prosecution from the outset.228 However, suggestions were made concerning 
possible ways in which more restorative mechanisms could also be incorporated into 
Rwanda’s transitional justice. This first regarded the number of prosecutions to be held. 
Thinking it resource-wise impossible and further impeding for the country’s stability 
and reconciliation to bring every perpetrator to account, the report suggested to only 
prosecute the main offenders, in terms of a symbolic and representative act. For 
perpetrators further down the chain of command, a more restorative approach then 
could have been pursued. One concrete option put forward was the setting up of 
commissions with the power to grant impunity to those who were coerced into killing, 
and those who would come forward, confess, and compensate.229 Further, the report 
suggested setting up a commission of inquiry in addition to the trials.230 
 In summary, it can be said that the majority of actors, including the Rwandan 
government, the international community and human rights NGOs, promoted justice 
through prosecution and punishment, and thus a retributive approach. Another 
mechanism being discussed was a truth commission. Such a more restorative approach 
was however mainly regarded as a supplement to criminal prosecution, and discussions 
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revolved around the possibility to only have trials for some symbolic few, namely the 
instigators of the genocide.231 Even after Rwanda had already enacted national 
prosecution as the main policy dealing with the genocide, scholars continued to propose 
the establishment of a truth commission in the country. To a large part this was regarded 
necessary in order to have an impartial mechanism to stop perceptions of victor’s justice 
in the country that posed obstacles to national reconciliation.232 
In the end, Rwanda decided to pursue a policy of maximal accountability and 
enacted national prosecution as the main mechanism to address the genocide.233 On 30 
August 1996, Organic Law No. 08/96234 was passed. It provided the legal basis for the 
prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between   
1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. The law divided perpetrators into four 
categories, which corresponded to the gravity of the crimes committed. The organizers 
of the genocide and those who committed rape were put into category one. All other 
perpetrators who murdered someone in the genocide were in category two, whereas 
those who participated but did not kill someone were placed in category three. Category 
four comprised those who stole or destroyed property. Each category covered a different 
range of penalties. Until its abolition in 2007, category one offenders could be charged 
with the death penalty.235 The law further included two innovative procedures, namely 
confession and plea-bargaining. Whereas a confession was expected to serve the goals 
of establishing the truth and bringing justice to victims, plea-bargaining was introduced 
in order to address the issue of overcrowded prisons.236 National trials of genocide 
defendants began in late 1996.237 
The dependent variable takes on a retributive value in the form of Rwanda’s policy 
of national prosecution.238 The first retributive characteristic is that the transitional 
justice approach pursued puts punishment at the center, regarding it as the proper way to 
bring about justice and reconciliation. Further, the process is structured in a way that 
can be assigned to the retributive justice paradigm. There is no emphasis on dialogue or 
involvement of all stakeholders. On the contrary, the process is clearly adversarial. Even 
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though the arrangement of dividing perpetrators into four categories and the use of 
confession and plea-bargaining renders the approach an innovative one, the main 
concern remains with establishing the right form of punishment, justified in light of the 
crime that was committed. Although charges vary according to category and 
involvement of confession or plea-bargaining, within those ranges they are still fixed 
ex-ante.239 It is also typical for a retributive approach that the mechanism employed 
perceives justice mainly through a legal lens. That this was the case in the Rwandan 
approach can be seen in the emphasis placed on extensive prosecution and also in the 
fact that rendering justice was regarded as closely connected to the building of a 
functioning judicial system and a rule of law.240 The classification of the Rwandan 
transitional justice approach as retributive is furthered by the initial inclusion of the 
death penalty as sentence. Capital punishment is especially retributive since empirical 
studies suggest that it does not contribute to objectives such as deterrence more 
effective than imprisonment. Critics of death penalty in Rwanda argued that it would be 
viewed as vengeance instead of contributing to the supposed objective of 
reconciliation.241 This perception was reinforced by the way in which the death penalty 
was carried out, namely in the form of public executions in crowded stadiums.242 
Capital punishment was only abolished in 2007, mainly due to external pressure.243 A 
final point concerns the priorities set among different objectives and mechanisms. The 
Kigali Conference suggested an authority with the sole task of producing “a definitive 
and objective record of this crime”244 to be set up. In 1999, Rwanda established the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), which had already been 
provided for in the Arusha Accords. Even though this could be understood as the 
country pursuing a more restorative approach, the fact that Rwanda, restrained by 
limited resources, chose to give financial and temporal primacy to establishing 
accountability through extensive prosecution again shows that it perceived transitional 
justice in a retributive manner. In addition, the NURC is not an impartial truth 
commission but rather a state institution that establishes a historical account according 
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to the governments’ view of events and promotes reconciliation through seminars and 
the like.245  
Even though prosecution and punishment can be described as the main mechanism 
employed by Rwanda to address the genocide,246 with most resources, energy and 
attention focusing on that area, there were other efforts undertaken as well. Those 
revolve around the RPF’s ideology, which is based on the conviction that the ethnic 
groups were invented in colonial times and that there is one Rwandan people and all 
political action should aim at national unity. Many such efforts were coordinated by the 
NURC and included remembrance, solidarity camps promoting re-education, or new 
national symbols.247 
2.3 Analysis 
Four variables are used to explain why Rwanda applied retributive justice in the 
aftermath of the genocide. The nature of the previous regime, transition type, and the 
role assumed by external actors and regional stability considerations express the 
political power that sets the boundaries in which a retributive approach becomes 
possible. The last variable additionally refers to specific conditions in the post-conflict 
situation that influenced the range of options available and to policy preferences 
resulting out of decision-makers’ values and beliefs, hence the political will needed for 
a retributive approach to be ultimately implemented. Due to the multi-causal nature of 
the research design, all variables are important in explaining the outcome of the torturer 
problem. Thus, for a retributive approach to be pursued, decision-makers need to have 
the political power, but also the political will to do so. 
2.3.1 Nature of the Previous Regime 
The first independent variable to be analyzed is the nature of the previous regime. 
According to the work of the several scholars elaborated in the theoretical part, a 
country is more likely to pursue a retributive approach to transitional justice if the 
former regime enjoyed relatively low levels of legitimacy and at the same time was very 
repressive, in a way that left the opposition with no opportunity to voice its discontent. 
The correlation with the dependent variable is supposed to be the stronger the less time 
there is between periods of repressive violence and the situation in which decisions 
                                                
245 Cf. Oomen 2009, 190. 
246 Cf. Drumbl 2000, 290. 
247 Cf. Des Forges and Longman 2004, 61. 
   45 
about post-conflict policies are made. Further, a high level of complicity should result in 
a low desire for retribution.  
 The historical background of Rwanda is important when analyzing the population’s 
relationship to the former regime. The central role that the belonging to an ethnic group 
assumed in societal life, constructed to distract from the real, political discrepancies, has 
to be born in mind.248 Thus, it is not possible to speak of the attitude of the population 
as one, homogeneous unit, towards the regime. Roughly four groups can be 
distinguished according to their different roles in the history of the country and their 
relation to the former government: Hutu within the country, Tutsi within the country, 
exiled Tutsi, and Hutu opposition forces within the country. The latter category refers to 
the regional struggle for power, mainly between Hutu elites from the southern and those 
from the northern provinces.249 This is not to say that all those were homogeneous 
groups. For instance, it is not to be suggested that all Hutu had the same attitude 
towards the regime, not even that there actually was such a category as ‘the Hutu’. 
However, basing the analysis on this distinction between the named groups is justified 
in light of the central role that ethnicity assumed in Rwandan politics, and because the 
interests of the respective ethnic groups were depicted as competing.250 Since the post-
independence governments clearly affiliated themselves with the Hutu, and favored 
them in their policies, the perception of the regime is most likely to have varied 
according to belonging to one of the groups. 
As mentioned before, Rwanda was governed by two regimes following 
independence. Both were based on the ideology of ‘Hutu power’ and drew their 
legitimacy from a group solidarity that was build upon the constructed dichotomy of 
ethnic groups in the country, as well as upon hate propaganda directed against the Tutsi. 
Concerning the Hutu, the regime drew its legitimacy from depicting itself as an agent of 
achieving a better life for them. Here, memories of Rwanda’s past played a role, 
because the Hutu had been discriminated under colonial rule, when the Tutsi held the 
monopoly of power over the Hutu. However, for the Tutsi, who were discriminated and 
marginalized after Rwanda gained independence, the regime bore no legitimacy. 
 To further structure the attitude held towards the former regime, the framework 
mentioned before as suggested by Nedelsky (2004) can be used. She distinguishes two 
ways in which authoritarian regimes seek to achieve compliance, namely cooptation and 
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repression. In Rwanda, both were used in an interrelated manner. The Hutu Power 
ideology was employed to establish solidarity among the Hutu, which were accordingly 
co-opted to support the regime. Repression, which openly took on the form of 
marginalizing the Tutsi group while propagating fear of a revived Tutsi hegemony, thus 
at the same time served to enforce cooptation within the Hutu group: “Killing Tutsi was 
a political tradition in postcolonial Rwanda; it brought people together.”251 In addition, 
under the guise of ethnic conflict, any emerging political opposition was repressed.252 
Nedelsky suggests in a next step to analyze the population’s relationship to the regime. 
In Rwanda, for both Hutu and Tutsi cooptation as well as internal exile of mainly the 
latter prevailed for several reasons. First of all, historical experience from the outset of 
the 1959 Revolution had shown that opposition would be repressed, and massacres 
served to intimidate Tutsi.253 Further, the Rwandan culture favored almost unquestioned 
obedience to authority, a characteristic that was reinforced by the strict hierarchical 
organization of the society.254 This stems to a big part from the country’s geography and 
the historical development of its state. Rwanda is located in a very hilly region, so that it 
originally consisted of numerous micro-states that were within time annexed by the 
emerging kingdom.255 In the process of centralization of power, a very hierarchical 
society emerged, with strong authority on the central level, exercised by the king, as 
well as the local level, represented by chiefs. The hierarchical structure was reflected in 
the organization of the Rwandan state, which in 1994 consisted of prefectures, which 
were further divided into communes, sectors and finally cells; a structure that was 
misused by the regime to ensure compliance and by the instigators of the genocide to 
execute the massacres.256 Gourevitch (1998) stresses the importance of the Rwandan 
culture of obedience: “In fact, the genocide was the product of order, authoritarianism, 
decades of modern political theorizing and indoctrination, and one of the most 
meticulously administered states in history.”257 Opposition was exercised mainly by the 
exiled Tutsi community, to whom the return to Rwanda was neglected, and eventually 
by the RPF. Internal opposition grew in the forefront of the genocide, when Rwanda’s 
economy broke down due to world market developments and various parties challenged 
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the single party system enacted by the MRND. It culminated in 1992 when 50,000 
people participated in a street protest in Kigali.258 
In Rwanda, transitional justice addresses the genocide and its roots. Therefore, in 
addition to the perception the population had of the regime, the question emerges if it 
saw the genocide as justified. There were of course many Rwandans who did not 
perceive the genocide as legitimate. Apart from the Tutsi and members of the political 
opposition, who were the targets of the violence, there were also Hutu who openly 
opposed the killings. However, a huge part of the perpetrators after being detained still 
did not show remorse because they regarded themselves as having acted in a situation of 
war and denied that genocide had taken place. Due to propaganda, many thought they 
were acting out of self-defense, and thus perceived the extremists’ orders as 
legitimate.259 
Political violence varied over time and was publicly directed against the Tutsi as a 
group but actually aimed at the repression of any political opposition force. However, 
repression clearly increased in the period preceding the genocide. In fact, political 
violence corresponded to the decreasing level of legitimacy of the regime starting in the 
1980s. It culminated in the first days of the genocide when several members of the 
opposition movement as well as moderate politicians from the regime’s cabinet were 
assassinated.260 Thus, the memory of terror was very much afresh in the period 
following the end of the genocide. Furthermore, decisions about transitional justice 
were made swiftly, right after the new regime came into power. According to the 
mentioned hypotheses, both of those factors speak for a retributive approach to be 
pursued. 
A last point concerns the level of complicity, which according to Huntington (1995) 
and Elster (1998) should be rather low for retribution to be favored. This however 
assumes that those complicit have the power to influence decisions made about 
transitional justice. In Rwanda, the level of complicity was extremely high. Estimations 
are that as many as 750,000 people, constituting about one fourth of the Rwandan adult 
population, were involved in the killings.261 However, those in power to make decisions 
in the post-conflict situation were almost exclusively the ones that had fought to end the 
violence. The hypothesis put forward by Huntington and Elster can still provide an 
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explanation for the retributive approach pursued in Rwanda if it is refined in a way that 
takes into account the stakeholders who have the power to make decisions, and thus the 
mode of transition. The decision-makers in post-conflict Rwanda were not complicit in 
the genocide. Hence, while the original hypothesis might hold true in cases where broad 
societal support is needed after a transition, in Rwanda the post-conflict regime was 
relatively free to implement its vision of transitional justice, a matter which is discussed 
in more detail in the next part. 
2.3.2 Transition Type 
As mentioned before, the variable transition type refers to the process of regime 
replacement. Based on Huntington’s (1994) work, the hypothesis emerges that 
retributive justice becomes most likely if the opposition enforces the regime change and 
if in the process the former regime cannot retain a position of power within the country. 
It is difficult to place Rwanda, being a post-conflict society,262 in one of 
Huntington’s categories, since the latter refer clearly to the context of post-communist 
transitions and not to a situation of genocide or civil war. However, the transition mode 
that Rwanda comes closest to is replacement. The RPF was the opposition force that 
enforced the regime change by military means. It invaded the country in October 1990. 
Following this, there were four years of civil war. On 18 July 1994, the RPF stopped the 
genocide through occupation of the country and consequently replaced the extremist 
regime. The transition type can thus be summarized as a military victory of the 
opposition forces.263 The distribution of power was clearly in favor of the RPF: 
The power shift – from Hutu to Tutsi rule – was so sudden and so complete that domestic 
political constraints on the numbers of perpetrators subject to prosecution all but vanished 
overnight.264 
Most leaders of the former regime who planned the genocide had fled Rwanda, and 
therefore were in no position to influence the emerging distribution of power within the 
country.265 However, many retained a power base outside the country and continued the 
spread of genocide ideology and recruitment of forces in refugee camps, which were 
full of Hutu refugees as well as soldiers from the former regime’s army.266 Inside 
Rwanda, the military victory was followed by massive arrests of suspected genocide 
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perpetrators in order to stop ongoing violence and establish a situation of security and 
stability.267 The thousands of people who were detained no longer posing a threat to the 
RPF and others staying quiet out of fear about the genocide survivors taking vengeance, 
added to the RPF’s monopoly on political power. The context of the Rwandan transition 
entails that transitional justice was mainly an elite decision. Even though the post-
genocide regime stressed the importance of societal reconciliation and democracy,268 it 
was relatively free to implement the policy it favored. Understandably, most Hutu did 
not prefer retribution, since even if they were not guilty there was a risk of them being 
accused of crimes nevertheless, and due to the overburdened justice system even a 
person who was innocent or had only committed a minor assault could spend years in 
prison before being put on trial.269 
The RPF had been founded among exiled Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Although the 
majority of RPF members were consequently Tutsi, it depicted itself as not constituting 
an ethnic opposition to the Hutu but a political opposition to the extremist regime.270 
After the RPF assumed control over the country, it established the transitional 
Government of National Unity. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu who had been affiliated with 
the RPF since 1990, became president and General Kagame vice-president.271 Even 
though the government promoted an ideology of a unified nation, in which there was no 
room for ethnic antagonisms,272 it remained sensitive to giving every ethnic group the 
feeling to be represented. This was regarded especially important in light of the 
historical experience of continuous hegemony of one group over the other, and the 
violence that had resulted out of marginalization. A perceived return to colonial Tutsi 
hegemony feared by the majority Hutu population was to be avoided. The transitional 
government thus included various parties, and ministries were given to both Hutu and 
Tutsi. However, real power remained with the RPF.273 The transitional government 
therefore had the political power to implement its favored approach, according to its 
objectives and believes of how to achieve those.274 Thus, the central role that Welsh 
(1994) assigns to bargaining and compromise in the transition process cannot be 
confirmed in the Rwandan case. That power was clearly distributed in favor of the RPF 
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can also be seen in the treatment of RPA soldiers charged with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The majority of those were first of all not prosecuted at all. In 
addition, the few trials that were held took place in military courts of which the public 
had little knowledge and were characterized by light sentences.275 
2.3.3 External Actors & Foreign Policy Considerations 
In addition to factors derived from the domestic context, forces from outside Rwanda 
also influenced the outcome of the torturer problem in the country. As mentioned 
before, Kaufman (2005) stresses that it is important to understand why states get 
involved in the transitional justice process of other countries. He suggests two criteria 
on which different transitional justice options are commonly judged. Subsequently, 
according to him, external actors’ support of a country’s post-conflict policy depends 
first of all on the latter’s correspondence to domestic and/or international law, and 
second of all on if it is perceived to be just in terms of legitimacy, fairness and 
impartiality.276 Accordingly, it is to be tested if external actors and the international 
climate they were operating in promoted retributive justice. Further, foreign policy 
considerations of Rwanda and their influence on transitional justice also have to be 
taken into account. 
 There are two main ways in which external actors were involved in the transitional 
justice process in Rwanda. On the one hand, after the end of the genocide, international 
interest in Rwanda’s post-conflict policies was high, so that many agents assumed a 
consulting position, promoting what they regarded the best approach for the country to 
take. On the other hand, donors and NGOs played an important role in providing the 
financial resources and technical assistance for the judicial infrastructure and 
institutions that were needed to conduct the genocide trials.277 Since Rwanda, whose 
bad economy had been further devastated by the genocide, depended on foreign aid, it 
could be assumed that donors could exercise a certain influence over the country’s post-
conflict policies in determining how the aid money would be used. However, two 
factors restricted donors’ power in that area. First of all, the structural adjustment 
programs of the 1990s were named as one factor explaining the context, which made the 
genocide possible, since they added to the impoverishment of the population and thus 
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the fight for resources.278 Secondly, donors also shared in the complicity of the 
genocide, because aid money had been used by the authoritarian regime to finance 
repression and violence, and a failure to stop the foreign aid flow had provided the 
regime with a legitimate appearance.279 Since both of theses points could be used as a 
sort of moral blackmail for assisting post-genocide Rwanda in every possible way 
without conditions attached, donors’ influence was somewhat limited.280  
In its decision to establish the ICTR, the UN, representing the international 
community, clearly chose a retributive approach to transitional justice after the 
Rwandan genocide. This can be explained by various factors. To begin with, 
international norms and laws have to be considered. Based on past experience rooted in 
the Nuremberg Trials, for the international community “criminal trials and incarceration 
of selected guilty individuals constitutes the preferred and often exclusive mechanism to 
respond to all situations of genocide and crimes against humanity.”281 The body of 
international law, largely building on international humanitarian and criminal law and 
the Genocide Convention, thus promotes a retributive approach to justice.282 The 
application of retributive justice was rendered even more likely by the official finding 
that genocide had taken place in Rwanda, which brought the legal and political 
obligation to bring the perpetrators to account with it.283 This corresponds to Kaufman’s 
criterion of ‘what is just’. Further, acknowledging the violence as genocide had 
powerful moral implications.284 Having failed to intervene to stop the massacres, the 
international community was highly motivated to help Rwanda to address that period 
and move forward, and thus clear the conscience of the international community 
itself.285 In addition, the decision to pursue a retributive approach with the establishment 
of an ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda has to be placed into the temporal context of a revival 
of international jurisdiction. With the establishment of the ICTY, the international 
community had just reaffirmed its adherence to human rights and the consequences that 
would result from violating the latter. The failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide 
and the threat of accusations of racism provided the international community with 
another reason to spend as much energy and resources on transitional justice in Rwanda 
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as it had done in the former Yugoslavia, and demonstrate this to the world in a symbolic 
manner by the establishment of a second international tribunal.286 
The ICTR itself can then be regarded an independent variable influencing 
transitional justice in Rwanda. Since the ICTR from the beginning on assumed primacy 
over any measures enacted on the national level,287 it clearly restricted the range of 
options that could be implemented within Rwanda. The tribunal promoted a retributive 
approach and sought to prosecute the masterminds of the genocide.288 Thus, it would 
have been difficult to establish a South African style truth commission, providing 
amnesty from prosecution for a full and truthful account of what happened. Further, a 
certain competition over custody emerged between the ICTR and the Rwandan 
government. This tension can provide an additional explanation for the government’s 
swift adaption of the Organic Law No. 08/96.289 On the other side, the restricting 
influence of the ICTR should not be overestimated since most of the extremist leaders 
had already fled Rwanda after the RPF’s military victory, and there would still have 
been the possibility to employ a more restorative approach on the national level for 
those perpetrators that were further down the chain of command. Moreover, it has to be 
born in mind that the Rwandan government had initially asked for a tribunal to be 
established, and only withdrew its support because of disagreements concerning mainly 
points such as the location of the tribunal, its temporal jurisdiction being limited to 
1994, the exclusion of the death penalty, and the possibility of prison sentences being 
served outside of Rwanda.290 Thus, the ICTR can be seen as both, a restriction on the 
range of transitional justice options available in Rwanda as well as an expression of the 
retributive approach that was favored by the Rwandan government from the very 
beginning. 
Another category of agents to be considered is that of external non-state actors. 
This includes scholars from the emerging transitional justice epistemic community and 
NGOs. Especially the latter influenced the post-conflict policy debate by publishing 
detailed information about the atrocities and by advocating their favored solutions.291 
Most scholars who focused their work on Rwanda as well as individuals who consulted 
the Rwandan government due to their experience in other transitions regarded 
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prosecution as the necessary reaction to the crimes committed during the genocide.292 
NGOs drew similar conclusions. Especially human rights NGOs clearly demanded the 
crimes to be condemned and the perpetrators to be held responsible.293 Their lobbying 
efforts critically contributed to the international community’s acknowledgment that 
genocide had taken place and the establishment of the ICTR.294 Various NGOs called 
the violence in Rwanda ‘genocide’ while it was still ongoing, as a statement published 
in a HRW report in May 1994 demonstrates: 
Human Rights Watch, the Féderation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (based in Paris), 
Amnesty International, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development (based in Montreal, Canada), Oxfam UK and other international 
nongovernmental organizations have condemned the slaughter as genocide.295 
By disseminating detailed information that showed the seriousness of the situation and 
the cruelty of the atrocities, the NGOs put pressure on the UN to investigate and react. 
The latter subsequently sent a mission of inquiry to Rwanda.296 Further, NGOs insisted 
on reacting to the genocide with a retributive justice approach. For instance, HRW 
stated as early as May 1994 that the “international community must insist upon 
accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of international 
humanitarian law.”297 In a similar manner, AI published the following in a report: “It is 
essential to bring those responsible for human rights violations and abuses to justice. 
[...] Prosecution and punishment break the cycle of crime and impunity.”298 AI further 
stressed the “duty of the Rwandese authorities – and those of other countries – to try 
people accused of genocide [...]”299 as a measure complementing the efforts undertaken 
by the ICTR. 
It can be inferred that human rights NGOs played an important role first of all in 
establishing an account of the massacres, which brought mentioned legal and moral 
obligations with it. They further pressured the international community and reminded it 
of the steps that had to be taken. In addition, the NGOs’ work was of importance to the 
transitional governments’ retributive approach. Due to the good reputation and 
impartiality of organizations such as HRW or AI, the information they disseminate and 
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conclusions they draw out of it are commonly accepted to be true and unbiased.300 In 
Rwanda, it was not necessary to publish information about the scale and horror of the 
atrocities in order to put the government under pressure to take action, since the latter, 
emerging as the victorious power out of a civil war and not being complicit in the 
genocide, had the intention to address the crimes anyway. However, the reports 
published by NGOs provided the Rwandan transitional government with legitimacy and 
credibility with regards to the policies it enacted to address the genocide. The numbers 
established by independent and objective agents showed the enormous scale of the 
violence, and conclusions drawn by the NGOs, namely the necessity to address those 
crimes in a retributive manner, supported the government in its stance on the subject. 
Having an objective and well-respected actor coming to the same conclusion could 
further be used to avert accusations of victor’s justice with regards to the government’s 
initial decision to prosecute and punish every person who committed genocidal 
crimes.301 
Thus, external actors favored a retributive approach to be applied in the Rwandan 
transitional justice process. And even among those that suggested the more restorative 
approach of a truth commission, the latter was by most only regarded as a mechanism to 
be employed in addition to trials. It also has to be mentioned that many who initially 
promoted a retributive approach changed their mind after trials started. This has 
however to be ascribed to the dysfunctional Rwandan justice system, which in many 
points failed to provide international legal standards.302 
Another variable that involves issues beyond the domestic realm concerns foreign 
policy considerations of Rwanda. Again, the question arises, if those were favorable to a 
retributive approach. The most pressing issue in the field of foreign affairs in the 
aftermath of the genocide was the repatriation of refugees. Throughout the genocide and 
the RPF invasion about two million people, out of a total population of about seven 
million, fled to Rwanda’s neighboring countries Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaïre, 
today’s Congo. In addition, the atrocities had displaced an enormous number of people 
inside of Rwanda.303 Returning the masses of refugees, and reintegrating them into 
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society became a crucial topic for the transitional government.304 One factor explaining 
the urgency that the repatriation of refugees had is that after the genocide about forty 
per cent of the population was either dead or in exile, and there was subsequently an 
enormous lack in human resources.305 Furthermore, there was ongoing conflict in the 
refugee camps, some of which were under the control of extremists that had fled 
Rwanda after the RPF’s victory. Therefore, the return of the refugees also became a 
point of interest for the RPF in terms of its political control over the population, which 
could only be granted if the latter was within the country’s borders.306 In addition, with 
infiltrations from the camps into Rwanda starting in September 1994, the refugee 
problem posed a serious threat to the country’s security situation. The settling of this 
issue was also pressed for by the international community, and was made a condition 
for Rwanda to receive foreign aid.307 However, many refugees refused to go back to 
Rwanda because returnees were often arrested on the accusation of participation in the 
genocide, even if they were promised otherwise beforehand, and revenge killings took 
place.308 In summary, the main dilemma concerning the refugee issue was that the 
Rwandan government saw their repatriation as necessary in order to secure stability, 
whereas international organizations working in the camps as well as the refugees 
themselves feared that they would be subjected to acts of revenge in Rwanda.309 
Concerning the decision to apply retributive justice, the refugee problem added to the 
government’s perception that priority was to be given to the re-establishment of security 
and peace within the country. The fact that some of the instigators of the genocide still 
launched attacks from abroad added to the government’s perception that extremists did 
not give up their horrible goal of Tutsi extermination and violence needed to be stopped, 
and that this was only possible through detention followed by prosecution and, if guilt 
was proven, punishment.310 
2.3.4 Values and Beliefs 
This far, the analysis has taken into account factors that influence the choice of 
transitional justice approach in terms of political power and capacity. In addition to that, 
the political will to implement a certain policy has to exist. Therefore, decision-makers’ 
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beliefs about which policy is best suited to reach the objectives they prioritize also 
matters. According to Elster (1998), “many regimes have based their policies on beliefs 
about the cathartic powers of truth and about the beneficial deterrent effects of severe 
punishments.”311 Since a complex analysis of individual decision-makers’ beliefs and of 
their aggregation into a policy would exceed the scope of this thesis, values and beliefs 
are derived from the policy preferences that were officially stated. In addition, the 
choice of transitional justice approach is influenced by the conclusions that decision-
makers draw out of the constraints under which they act. The question is whether both 
factors, conclusions drawn from specific constraints as well as leaders’ values and 
beliefs, were conducive to a retributive justice approach. 
As elaborated in chapter 2.1, the main factors that transitional justice in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide had to take into account were the culture of 
impunity, the ideology of ethnic hatred,312 the high level of complicity in the killings, 
the state of the institutions after the genocide and the urgent need for reconciliation. On 
base of this, the transitional government set up various objectives, which it regarded as 
interconnected. Among those were healing and stabilizing the society, promoting 
reconciliation, establishing a truthful account of the genocide, bringing perpetrators to 
account, combating impunity, and developing a functioning rule of law.313 In the Kigali 
Conference, the objectives were summarized as follows:  
The Conference’s overall objective was to provide for the Rwandan government and the 
Rwandan society a forum for developing a viable and coherent national policy to respond to 
the genocide in a manner that, on one hand re-establishes accountability and uproots impunity 
and on the other hand enable us to stabilise the society quickly.314 
The application of retributive justice to achieve those goals has to be seen in light of the 
general beliefs that were held about the benefits of such an approach. In the already 
mentioned arguments that are commonly brought forward prosecution is regarded as the 
best way to give the new regime credibility and legitimacy, to set moral standards, to 
fight impunity while having a deterring effect, to bring about justice, and to 
acknowledge victims’ suffering and counteract revisionism by establishing a truthful 
account of what happened. Those corresponded to the needs that decision-makers in 
Rwanda thought transitional justice had to address.315 Furthermore, bringing individual 
perpetrators to account was illustrated as a way to establish individual responsibility, 
                                                
311 Elster 1998, 43. 
312 Cf. Republic of Rwanda 1995, 10. 
313 Cf. Kritz et al. 1998, 1487, 1492; Jones 2010, 98, 183; Republic of Rwanda 1995, 6-7. 
314 Republic of Rwanda 1995, 8. 
315 Cf. Republic of Rwanda 1995, 7. 
   57 
and thus counter the deadly Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy by preventing guilt from being 
ascribed to the whole Hutu group.316 Moreover, it was taken into account that it had 
been the government, which had misused its power and the state apparatus to incite the 
population and to plan the genocide.317 Therefore, establishing a functioning rule of law 
was regarded essential in order to avoid such an event from ever happening again.318 All 
of those factors were favorable to a retributive approach. 
Another point of analysis referring to the impact of decision-makers’ beliefs is 
suggested by Sieff and Wright (1999), who argue that “when political leaders view 
peace and justice as reconcilable, they are more likely to advocate prosecutions.”319 In 
Rwanda, the government perceived the two not only as reconcilable but even as 
interdependent. Justice in terms of bringing genocide perpetrators to account while at 
the same time establishing a rule of law in the country was regarded as absolutely 
necessary for a stable and secure future situation to emerge.320 Accordingly, decision-
makers’ beliefs reinforced prosecution and punishment as a viable transitional justice 
option. 
Concerning the constraints, under which decision-makers acted, the situation was 
first of all characterized by serious time pressure. In order to stop the ongoing violence, 
offenders had to be detained immediately. For the same reasons there was an urgent 
need to prosecute the planners of the genocide, many of which continued the killings 
from neighboring countries, especially targeting witnesses.321  However, there were also 
factors that rendered a retributive approach difficult to implement. The most serious 
challenge was posed by the high number of suspected genocide perpetrators, coupled 
with the devastated state of the country’s legal institutions and infrastructure. By 1996, 
120,000 people were detained,322 and over time the number of people estimated to have 
participated in the genocide grew up to 750,000.323 Even though many external actors 
declared it impossible to bring every perpetrator to account, the transitional government 
insisted on its approach of maximum accountability.324 Thus, this specific challenge 
could not induce the government to move away from its highly retributive approach. 
However, recognizing the impossibility to try every perpetrator, the government was 
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prompted to adjust its approach and thus categorized offenders in Organic Law No. 
08/96, while recognizing that it might not be able to prosecute all guilty.325 Despite this 
innovative clause, Rwanda implemented a retributive process. Hence, the conclusion 
that decision-makers drew out of this specific constraint was to find a way to still apply 
retributive justice to as many perpetrators as possible. 
2.3.5 Evaluation 
In summary, there were various factors that bore an influence on the choice of 
transitional justice approach in Rwanda. As mentioned before, none of the analyzed 
variables can account for the outcome of the torturer problem in the case of Rwanda on 
its own. However, taken together the analyzed features present before, during, and after 
the regime change resulted in the retributive approach that the country pursued after the 
genocide. 
 In the case study at hand, the dependent variable takes on the value of retributive 
justice. As already mentioned, transitional justice can be regarded as a function of 
political power and political will. In Rwanda, political power after the genocide was 
held by the RPF. Since the latter emerged as the victorious power out of a military 
conflict and occupied the country, there was no need to balance the interests of a 
multitude of actors with different agendas in the form of a compromise. This specific 
shape of the variable of ‘transition type’ has implications for the impact of the variable 
of ‘nature of previous regime’. Power being distributed clearly in favor of the RPF, it 
did not depend as strongly on societal support to implement its favored policy. Thus, 
while experiences the population had made in the past played a certain role, the attitudes 
that the ones in power after the transition held towards the former regime were those 
that mattered most. Among the actors that made decisions about transitional justice, the 
previous regime enjoyed no legitimacy. Therefore, they favored the application of 
retributive justice. Further, the former regime’s employment of high levels of repression 
rendered a retributive approach more likely. In addition, repression grew over time, and 
the time span between the height of the violence and the time when decisions about 
transitional justice were made was very short, which according to the theories also 
points towards the enactment of prosecution and punishment. Concerning complicity, 
the high level of participation in the crimes constituted one of the main obstacles for the 
government to pursue a retributive approach. However, this had practical capability 
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reasons, and did not depart from a lack of political power to enact prosecution. Since the 
decision-makers in post-genocide Rwanda were not affiliated with genocidal crimes of 
the previous regime, they promoted a retributive approach despite the high level of 
complicity within the society. The role played by external actors, who had a strong 
presence in post-genocide Rwanda, also explains why retributive justice was applied. 
The international community itself clearly pursued a retributive approach with the 
establishment of the ICTR. In addition, international norms promoted retributive justice. 
NGOs further played an important role in attaching the label ‘genocide’ to the violence 
in Rwanda and pointing out the political, legal and moral consequences of this, and 
subsequently pushed for perpetrators to be brought to account. This backed the 
transitional government in its policies by providing its stance on the subject with 
credibility and legitimacy. Finally, most individuals that assumed a consulting role in 
post-genocide Rwanda initially also promoted a retributive approach. With regards to 
regional stability considerations of Rwanda, the central concern was the threat that the 
refugee issue and ongoing attacks from refugee camps abroad posed to the country’s 
security as well as to political power. The conclusions drawn out of this, namely the 
need to detain perpetrators and put them on trial, also pointed towards a retributive 
approach. Finally, the political will to pursue retributive justice showed itself in 
decision-makers’ values and beliefs, expressed in the objectives the transitional 
government established on the base of what it saw as causes of the violence as well as 
objectives it set for the future. Priorities set by the government in this regard confirm its 
belief in retributive justice as the best approach. In addition, the time pressure resulting 
out of the need to stop the ongoing violence only served to reinforce the governments’ 
belief in the necessity to put the perpetrators on trial.  Finally, the most serious 
challenge to a retributive approach was posed by the high number of potential 
defendants. The fact that the government pursued a policy of maximal accountability 
despite this constraint reflects its strong political will to apply retributive justice. 
Conclusion 
In the Rwandan genocide, about 800,000 people, mainly Tutsi, but also Hutu and Twa 
who sympathized with the former, were killed by an estimated number of 750,000 
perpetrators from the Hutu population group. The genocide was ended together with the 
RPF’s military victory in the Rwandan civil war, which had been going on for four 
years. Facing a traumatized population split into alleged perpetrators and victims, the 
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RPF had to make decisions about how to deal with the horrible past events, while at the 
same time leading Rwanda into a stable future in which such violence would not 
reoccur. The political leaders subsequently decided to pursue a policy of maximal 
accountability, with the goal of putting every single suspected genocide perpetrator on 
trial and punishing the guilty. This highly retributive approach constituted the main 
policy employed by Rwanda to deal with the genocide. Considering the practical 
challenges in terms of resources, time, personnel, and the number of potential 
defendants, as well as the Western origin of the retributive understanding of justice, it 
seems astonishing that Rwanda enacted this particular policy.  
The question this thesis departed from was why Rwanda chose to apply retributive 
justice after the genocide. On the base of scholarly work written mainly on third wave 
transitions, different variables were explored in terms of the influence they had on 
Rwanda’s decision to enact a retributive transitional justice approach. In conclusion, 
Rwanda’s choice of a policy focusing on retribution can be explained by the following 
factors. It was partly the result of a mode of transition that provided the opposition party 
that enacted the regime change with a monopoly of political power, and of an 
enormously brutal and repressive former regime that enjoyed no legitimacy in the eyes 
of the decision-makers of the post-genocide era. In addition, the majority of external 
actors pursued a policy that promoted retribution in light of the serious human rights 
violations. Further, there was a situation of regional crisis triggered by the Rwandan 
refugees that made criminal prosecution of the genocide perpetrators appear crucial to 
the country’s security. And finally, the particular choice of transitional justice approach 
was also the outcome of decision-makers’ values and beliefs according to which 
retribution seemed the best option to achieve the policy goals that were established with 
regards to the country’s future. 
While accounting for the particular policy the country chose, testing the existing 
hypotheses on the Rwandan case study at the same time contributes to the conceptual 
framework of transitional justice. Even though the bulk of scholarly work that provided 
the conceptual basis for the analysis stems from the context of post-communist 
transitions, most of the hypotheses drawn from those were verified in the Rwandan 
case. Some had to be adjusted because they did not correspond to the specific context in 
which the Rwandan regime change has to be placed. Thus, it was demonstrated that in 
the Rwandan case the influence of the feature ‘level of complicity of the population’ 
was rendered less important due to the specific shape of another variable, namely the 
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‘transition type’. The outcome of the Rwandan mode of transition was a power 
monopoly being held by the very forces that had enacted the regime change. Therefore, 
the decision-makers were relatively free to implement their favored approach, and did 
not depend as much on societal support. It follows that the presence of a high level of 
complicity of the population in the country was not posing an obstacle big enough to 
make the dependent variable take on a less retributive value. At the same time, the 
limited influence of this specific variable cannot be solely ascribed to the present mode 
of transition, but also to actors’ values and beliefs, and the role that external actors 
played in strengthening the power position of the RPF and legitimizing its transitional 
justice policy. This demonstrates that such analysis has to be based on a multi-causal 
model that takes into account a variety of factors as well as their interaction. One of the 
variables on its own might constitute a necessary condition that has to be fulfilled to 
render a particular approach possible, but only by additionally taking into consideration 
all other factors influencing post-conflict decision-making, it can be fully explained 
why a particular approach was adopted in the end.  
In conclusion, it can be said that Rwanda did favor a retributive approach. Features 
that characterized the Rwandan situation before, during, and after the genocide resulted 
in the particular transitional justice policy it implemented. 
In a globalizing world where conflicts are increasingly of an inter-society nature, 
Rwanda serves as a valuable example for the issues at stake in a post-conflict society. 
Of course every country is unique, and faces particular challenges as well as 
opportunities. In most countries emerging from a period of violence the power balance 
is not distributed as clearly in favor of one party as this was the case in Rwanda. 
Further, the fact that in Rwanda genocide occurred entailed strong legal, political and 
moral obligations that might not be present in other cases. Accordingly, there is a need 
to constantly adapt the variables of the research design to present conditions. However, 
the underlying dilemmas as well as the basic factors influencing decision-making 
remain the same. 
Due to the increased involvement of state and non-state external actors in the 
transitional justice conduct of countries, the international dimension deserves more 
attention in such kinds of analysis. The Rwandan genocide took place over fifteen years 
ago. Since then, the already considerable influence of external actors and international 
norms further increased. Especially international norms became more durable and the 
commitment made by the international community to the adherence to human rights 
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was institutionalized in form of the ICC. Although there are nevertheless still many 
cases of human rights abuses, and the international community’s actions are in many 
cases based exclusively on power interests, the establishment of the ICC constitutes a 
significant step that reinforces the primacy given to retributive justice. The international 
dimension also gains importance due to the growing epistemic community in the field. 
This is manifested in a proliferation of institutes that offer consultation and advice on a 
variety of transitional justice instruments, many of which more restorative in character. 
The latest developments in Northern Africa demonstrate that issues of transitional 
justice are of central importance in the present world. Although the outcomes of the 
recent revolutionary movements of the so-called ‘Arab spring’ still remain to be seen, 
the countries in which a regime change was brought underway will have to make 
decisions about how to deal with their repressive past one way or another. The results 
such decision-making will come to are likely to be influenced by the very variables that 
were discussed in this thesis. Additionally, the decision-makers in those countries will 
most likely be more restricted in their power to implement their favored approach than 
this was the case in Rwanda due to the existence of the ICC, which makes amnesty as a 
bargaining tool to induce the ruling elite into resigning peacefully almost impossible. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the ICC does certainly not imply that in the future every 
country will implement a retributive approach. Although the ICC clearly embodies 
retributive justice, it only aims at prosecuting selected individuals very high up the 
chain of command for their responsibility in human rights violations. Questions 
concerning which approach out of a range of transitional justice options to adopt, 
questions that are influenced by the very factors that were discussed in this thesis, will 
still keep countries occupied in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   63 
Bibliography 
Scientific Literature 
 
Bachmann, Klaus. Vergeltung, Strafe, Amnestie. Eine vergleichende Studie zu 
Kollaboration und ihrer Aufarbeitung in Belgien, Polen und den Niederlanden. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang Int., 2011.  
 
BBC News. “Analysis. Why Bizimungu mattered.” BBC News Online March 23, 2000. 
Accessed August 29, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/688587.stm. 
 
Benomar, Jamal. “Justice after Transitions.” In Transitional justice: how emerging 
democracies reckon with former regimes, edited by Neil J. Kritz, 32-41. Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995. 
 
Braithwaite, John. Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Brannigan, Augustine and Jones, Nicholas A. 2009. “Genocide and the Legal Process in 
Rwanda. From Genocide Amnesty to the New Rule of law.” International Criminal 
Justice Review 19(2): 192-207. 
 
Brown, Stephen. “The rule of law and the hidden politics of transitional justice in 
Rwanda.” In Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace?, edited by Chandra 
Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega and Johanna Herman, 179-196. New York: 
Routledge, 2011. 
 
Clark, Phil. “Establishing a Conceptual Framework: Six Key Transitional Justice 
Themes.“ In After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, 191-206. 
London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Clark, Phil and Kaufman, Zachary D. “The Past is Prologue: Planning the 1994 
Rwandan Genocide.“ In After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, 
1-19. London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Clark, Phil, Kaufman, Zachary D., and Nicolaïdis, Kalypso. “Tensions in Transitional 
Justice.“ In After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, 381-392. 
London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Crocker, David A. “Reckoning with Past Wrongs. A Normative Framework.” In Ethics 
& International Affairs. A Reader, edited by Joel H. Rosenthal and Christian Barry, 45-
64. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 
 
Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. 
New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003. 
 
Daly, Kathleen. 2001. “Restorative justice: the real story.” Paper presented at Scottish 
Criminology Conference, Edinburgh, 21-22 September 2000. Accessed July 31, 2011.  
http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/50321/kdpaper12.pdf.  
 
   64 
DeLaet, Debra L. 2004. Review of Beyond Retribution. Seeking Justice in the Shadows 
of War, by Rama Mani. Development in Practice 14(3): 457-458. 
 
Des Forges, Alison. 1999. “Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.” 
Human Rights Watch. Accessed July 31, 2011. 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/.  
 
Des Forges, Alison and Longman, Timothy. “Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda.” 
In My Neighbor, My Enemy. Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, 
edited by Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, 49-68. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Drumbl, Mark A. 2000. “Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide.” 
Punishment & Society 2: 287-307. 
 
Duff, Antony. “Restoration and Retribution.” In Restorative Justice and Criminal 
Justice. Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms?, edited by Andrew von Hirsch, Julian 
v. Roberts, and Anthony Bottoms, 43-60. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003. 
 
Elster, Jon. 1998. “Coming to terms with the past. A framework for the study of justice 
in the transition to democracy.” European Journal of Sociology 39: 7-48. 
 
Elster, Jon. Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Fujii, Lee A. Killing Neighbors. Webs of Violence in Rwanda. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Goldstone, Richard J. 1998. Foreword to Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. Facing 
History after Genocide and Mass Violence, by Martha Minow, ix-xiii. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
 
Gourevitch, Philip. We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our 
families. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998. 
 
HRW. 2006. “The Rwandan Genocide. How It Was Prepared.” Accessed August 08, 
2011. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century.” In Transitional justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former 
regimes, edited by Neil J. Kritz, 65-81. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1995. 
 
Huyse, Luc. “To Punish or to Pardon: a Devil’s Choice Dealing with Human Rights 
Violations Committed Under a Previous Regime.” In Human Rights Commissions and 
Ombudsman Officfes. National Experiences throughout the World, edited by Kamal 
Hossain, Leonard F. M. Besselink, Haile Selassie Gebre Selassie, and Edmond Völker, 
83-88. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. 
 
ICG. 1999. “Five years after the genocide in Rwanda: Justice in question.” ICG Report 
Rwanda No. 1. 
   65 
ICTJ. 2008. “What is Transitional Justice?” Accessed July 31, 2011. 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf. 
 
ICTR. 2000. “Prosecutor vs. Kanyabashi” (Case No. ICTR-96-15-I). Accessed July 31, 
2011.  
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKanyabashi%5Cindictment%5Ci
ndex.pdf. 
 
Jones, Nicholas A.  The Courts of Genocide. Oxon: Routledge, 2010. 
 
Kagame, Paul. Preface to After Genocide, by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, xxi-
xxvi. London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Kaufman, Zachary D. 2005. “The Future of Transitional Justice.” St. Antony’s 
International Review 1(1): 58-81. 
 
Kritz, Neil J. “The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice.” In Transitional justice: how 
emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, edited by Neil J. Kritz, xix-xxx. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995. 
 
Lemarchand, René. “The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” In After 
Genocide, edited by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, 65-76. London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Llewellyn, Jennifer J., and Howse, Robert. 1998. Restorative Justice: A Conceptual 
Framework. Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada. Quoted in Jones, 2010, 33-34. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killer:. Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
Mani, Rama.  Beyond Retribution. Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002. 
 
Marshall, Tony F. Restorative Justice. An Overview. London: Home Office, Research 
Development and Statistics Directorate, 1999. 
 
Melvern, Linda. “The Past is Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.” In After 
Genocide, edited by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, 21-31. London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Minow, Martha. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. Facing History after Genocide 
and Mass Violence. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998. 
 
Moghalu, Kingsley Chiedu. “Prosecute or Pardon? Between Truth Commissions and 
War Crimes Trials.” In Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in 
Africa, edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, 69-95. Scottsville: University 
of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009. 
 
Moran, John P. 1994. “The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: Prosecute and 
Punish or Forgive and Forget?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27(1): 95-109. 
 
Nedelsky, Nadya. 2004. “Divergent Responses to a Common past: Transitional Justice 
in the Czech Republic and Slovaskia.” Theory and Society 33(1): 65-115. 
   66 
Neier, Aryeh. War Crimes. Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice. 
New York: Times Books, 1998. 
 
Ntsebeza, Dumisa B. “Can Truth Commissions in Africa deliver justice?” In Human 
Rights in Africa. Legal Perspectives on their Protection and Promotion, edited by 
Anton Bösl, and Joseph Diescho, 375-388. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 
2009. 
 
Oomen, Barbara. “Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: The Example 
of Rwanda’s Multi-layered Justice Mechanisms.” In Building a Future on Peace and 
Justice, edited by Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda,175-202. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009. 
 
Osiel, Mark. Making Sense of Mass Atrocity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
 
Oxford Dictionaries. 2011. “Deserts.” Accessed July 31, 2011. 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deserts. 
 
Prunier, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Roberts, Paul. “Restoration and Retribution in International Criminal Justice: An 
Explanatory Analysis.” In Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice. Competing or 
Reconcilable Paradigms?, edited by Andrew von Hirsch, Julian v. Roberts, and 
Anthony Bottoms, 115-134. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003. 
 
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. “The new landscape of transitional justice.” In Transitional 
Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Beyond Truth versus Justice, edited by Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, 1-16. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. 
 
Sarkin, Jeremy. 1999. “The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda.” Human Rights Quarterly 21(3): 767-823. 
 
Schabas, William A. 1996. “Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide 
Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems.” Criminal Law Forum 7(3): 
523-560. 
 
Schabas, William A. “Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: A Spectrum of Options.“ In 
After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark, and Zachary D. Kaufman, 207-227. London: 
Hurst, 2008. 
 
Scharf, Michael P. 1999. “Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in the 
Aftermath of Genocide.” Journal of International Affairs 52(2): 621-638. 
 
Sieff, Michelle and Wright, Leslie Vinjamuri. 1999. “Reconciling Order and Justice? 
New Institutional Solutions in Post-Conflict States.” Journal of International Affairs 
52(2): 757-779. 
 
   67 
Smith, Charles D. 1995. Introduction to Transitional justice: how emerging 
democracies reckon with former regimes, by Neil J. Kritz, xv-xvii. Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace. 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha. “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding.” In 
Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, edited by Chandra 
Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, 1-18. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 
2009. 
 
Teitel, Ruti G. 2003. “Transitional Justice Genealogy.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 
16: 69-94. 
 
UN Security Council. 2004. “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary General” (S/2004/616). 23 August 2004. 
 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. “Inclusive Justice: The Limitations of Trial Justice and Truth 
Commissions.” In Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, 
edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, 44-68. Scottsville: University of 
KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009b. 
 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. “Transitional justice and human rights in Africa.” In Human 
Rights in Africa. Legal Perspectives on their Protection and Promotion, edited by 
Anton Bösl, and Joseph Diescho, 33-51. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 
2009a. 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew, v. Roberts, Julian, and Bottoms, Anthony. Restorative Justice and 
Criminal Justice. Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2003. 
 
Walgrave, Lode. “Imposing Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on the 
Judicial Reaction to Crime.” In Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice. Competing or 
Reconcilable Paradigms?, edited by Andrew von Hirsch, Julian v. Roberts, and 
Anthony Bottoms, 61-78. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003. 
 
Weinstein, Harvey M. and Stover, Eric. “Introduction: conflict, justice and 
reclamation.” In My Neighbor, My Enemy. Justice and Community in the Aftermath of 
Mass Atrocity, edited by Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, 49-68. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Welsh, Helga A. 1994. “Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
Comparative Politics 26(4): 379-394. 
 
Welsh, Helga A. 1996. “Dealing with the Communist past: Central and East European 
Experiences after 1990.” Europe-Asia Studies 48(3): 413-428. 
 
Williams, Paul D. “The Peacekeeping System, Britain and the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide.” In After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark, and Zachary D. Kaufman, 43-63. 
London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
 
   68 
Zalaquett, José. “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former 
Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints.” In Transitional justice: 
how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, edited by Neil J. Kritz, 3-31. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995. 
 
Zaum, Dominik. “Balancing Justice and Order: State-building and the Prosecution of 
War Crimes in Rwanda and Kosovo.“ In After Genocide, edited by Phil Clark, and 
Zachary D. Kaufman, 363-379. London: Hurst, 2008. 
 
Zehr, Howard. 1985. “Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice.” New Perspectives on 
Crime and Justice: Occasional Papers of the MCC Canada Victim Offender Ministries 
Program and the MCC U.S. Office of Criminal Justice 4. 
 
Research Material 
 
AI. 1994. “A call for UN human rights action on Rwanda and Burundi.” Index Number 
IOR 41/002/1994. Accessed August 27, 2011. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/002/1994/en/2d81b5bf-eb0b-4766-
a767-449d3a053e5c/ior410021994en.pdf. 
 
AI. 1995. “Rwanda: Crying out for justice.” Index Number AFR/47/005/1995. 
Accessed August 26, 2011. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/005/1995/en/1465e54a-eb61-11dd-
b8d6-03683db9c805/afr470051995en.pdf. 
 
HRW. 1994. “Genocide in Rwanda: April – May 1994.” Human Rights Watch/ Africa 
6(4). Accessed August 26, 2011. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/RWANDA945.PDFhttp://www.hrw.org/si
tes/default/files/reports/RWANDA945.PDF. 
 
Kritz, Neil J., Muna, Bernard, Pillay, Navanetbem, and Rudasingwa, Theogene. 1998. 
“The Rwanda Tribunal and its relationship to national trials in Rwanda.” American 
University International Law Review 13(6): 1469-1493. 
 
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions. 2011. “Context or historical background of 
Gacaca Courts.” Accessed July 31.  
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm. 
 
Organic Law No. 08/96. Accessed August 29, 2011. 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm. 
 
Republic of Rwanda. Office of the President. 1995. “Genocide, impunity and 
accountability: Dialogue for a national and international response.” Recommendations 
of the conference held in Kigali from November 1st to 5th, 1995. 
 
USIP. 1995. “Rwanda. Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide. A Report on a 
United States Institute of Peace Conference.” Accessed August 21, 2011. 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR13.pdf. 
 
 
   69 
Curriculum Vitae 
Bettina Heller 
E-Mail: bettina.heller@gmail.com 
Date of Birth: 02 May 1985 
Nationality: German 
 
Higher Education 
 
 M.A. Erasmus Mundus Global Studies  
01/ 2011 – 09/2011 University of Vienna, Austria 
 Major: Global History 
  
09/ 2010 – 12/ 2010 University of California, Santa Barbara, USA 
 Majors: Global Culture, Development Studies 
09/ 2009 – 08/ 2010 University of Wrocław, Poland 
 Majors: International Relations, Economics 
 
 B.A. International Cultural and Business Studies  
10/ 2006 – 09/ 2009  University of Passau, Germany 
     
Majors: American and English Studies, Political Sciences,  
Business Administration 
 Bachelor Thesis: ”Using Collective Memory: Die Rolle von  
Abraham Lincoln in Barack Obama’s Selbstdarstellung.“ 
09/ 2008 – 01/ 2009 University of Bangor, Wales: Exchange Term 
 Majors: English Literature, Business Administration 
 
07/ 2004  Obermenzinger Gymnasium, Munich, Germany 
  Abitur (school-leaving certificate) 
 
 
Work Experience 
 
08/ 2008 – 09/ 2008 American Consulate General, Munich, Germany 
 Internship in the Consular Section: 
 
  Translation and research work  
Assistance of applicants in the visa section 
Data administration in the passport section 
   70 
 
07/ 2007 – 11/ 2007  kuwi.netzwerk international e.V., Passau, Germany 
 Internship: Publication of the Year Book 
 
    Organization, layout, distribution, editorial responsibility 
  
 
Additional Qualifications 
 
Workshops Cross-cultural training, intercultural communication, 
visualization & presentation 
 
Conferences  China’s quest for African resources 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen Afrika und Europa  
Governance in the EU (Danube Summer School)  
Nation branding in a globalized world 
 
Extra-curricular activities 
 
02/ 2009 – 09/ 2009 Active member of Amnesty International, Passau 
09/ 2008 – 01/ 2009   Participation in the students newspaper Seren of Bangor University 
10/ 2006 – 09/ 2009 Active member of kuwi.netzwerk international e.V., Passau 
 
 
 
 
